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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The agency started this case by formal adjudicative proceeding under the Uniform
Land Sales Practices Act.

They heard it under Title 63, Chapter 46b, and reviewed it

under §63-46b-12 and R151-46b-12. The agency action is ready for review and this court
has jurisdiction under §63-46b-16(1).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues in this case arise out of a cease and desist order based on alleged
requirement to register a subdivision. Numerous procedural roadblocks have prevented
the registration.

Subdivider's objections to the propriety of the roadblocks have been

raised at each level of administrative procedure. The area of dispute has been narrowed
but the problem remains.
A.

Issue: Whether the order is valid if it is not supported by the statutes cited.
Standard of Review: In Savage Indus.v Utah State Tax. 811 P.2d 664

(Utah 1991), the agency's interpretation of the statutes was reversed by the supreme court
on a correction of error standard of review. The same standard should apply in this case
relative to the Division's contention that the Land Sales Practices Act applies to Mineral
Mountain Ranchos Subdivision. This issue is preserved in the record (R.364).
B:

Issue: Whether or not the Agency has authority to reconstruct the

exemption language of §57-1 l-4(l)(f) in such a way as to increase the subdivider's burden
1

under the statute.

Standard of Review: In Bonneville v. State Tax Commission, 858

P.2d 1045 (Ct. App. 1983), the court says "Because we find no explicit or implied grant of
discretion in section 59-12-104(15), we will review the Commission's interpretation under
a correction of error standard." In the present case, there being no grant of discretion in
regard to §57-1 l-4(l)(f), this court can review this issue under a correction of error
standard (Ferriera's Exhibits 9 & 10, R. 337-338).
C:

Issue: Whether the agency can rely on a change of wording in the statute

to override prior approvals obtained under Title 17 . This issue is preserved in
Ferrieras' Exhibits 9 & 10.
Standard of Review: This issue can be reviewed by the correction-of-error
standard as in Chevron v State Tax Commission, 847 P.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1983) where the
court states in its standard of review that, "We do not defer to an agency's statutory
interpretation unless the legislature has explicitly, or implicitly, granted the agency
discretion to interpret the statutory language at issue." (Emphasis added.) This issue is
preserved in Ferrieras' Exhibits 9 & 10.
D:

Issue: Whether it is lawful for an Administrative Law Judge and The

Executive Director of the Department of Commerce to issue final orders based on
illusionary definition of a statutory term. A question of correctness exists as well as a
question of the right to interpret statutes in absence of a legislative grant of discretion.
2

Standard of Review: A similar question was addressed in Mor-Flo v Board of
Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Ct. App. 1991) when the Commission assumed an expertise in
boiler construction which it did not possess.

The Mor-Flo case was decided on a

correction of error standard with no deference to the agency. The same standard should
be applied in this case. This issue is preserved in a general challenge of Division and the
Department of Commerce.
E.

Issue: Whether the cease and desist order could be made permanent

without a hearing if the Ferrieras were stopped from contesting the order by failure of the
Division to state a cause of action or by the Division stating a false cause of action. In
First Federal v Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984), the court could grant relief under
64-46b-16(a) on grounds that the order on which the agency action is based is
unconstitutional as applied because the act of contesting it would be self incriminating.
Standard of Review: A correction-of-error standard of review could be used as it
was in Stewart v Utah Public Service, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), where the court found
UCA 54-4-4.1(2) unconstitutional. Issue is preserved at R. 366.
F:

Issue: Whether it was lawful for the Division to start Adjudicative

procedure against the Ferrieras while falsely claiming authority for the process under
§57-11-13 and concealing the fact that they where proceeding under shelter of a different
statute. Issue preserved at R. 506.
3

Standard of Review: This court may grant relief under §63-46b-16(4) using a
correction of error standard of review as in Velarde v Board of Review. 831 P.2d 123 (Ct.
App. 1983) where the court concluded that "in denying Mrs. Velarde her death benefits
action and providing her no alternative remedy, without avoiding a clear social or
economic evil, Utah Code Ann. 35-2-13(b)(3) violates article 1, section 11 of the Utah
Code and is invalid". This issue is preserved (R. 366 -376) (R. 498) (R. 504 - 511).
G:

Issue: Whether the Division is enabled by statutes to shelve subdivided

application to register without giving required notices.
Standard of Review: This issue can be reviewed under §63-46b-16(4)(e) by a
correction of error standard as in Krantz v Department of Commerce 856 P.2d 369 (Ct.
App. 1983). In the present case, the Division of Real Estate failed to give the notices
required under § 57-11-9(1). Issue preserved (R. 593)
H:

Issue: Whether the Division had the right to withhold registration from the

Ferrieras unless the Ferrieras would offer recision rights to every person who bought a lot
from them within a five year period prior to their cease and desist order.
Standard of Review: This issue can be reviewed under §63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) by a
reasonableness and rationality standard as in Thorup Bros, v Auditing Division, 860 P.2d
324 (Utah 1983) Issue preserved (R. 19).

4

I:

Issue: Whether the Division acted lawfully when it stopped the sale of 50

acres a]] to one party because the Ferrieras would not offer redsioi) rights to aJl others
who purchased from them in the five years prior in view of their actions under §63-46b-20
and its compliance subsection (2)(a).
Standard of Review: This issue may be reviewed under §63-46b-16(4)(d) by a
correction of error standard as in Bevans v Industrial Comm., 790 P.2d 573 (Ct. App.
1990) where the agency was not statutorily enabled to reduce Beven's workers
compensation benefits. This issue is preserved (R. 22).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is caused by an assumption made by the Utah Division of Real Estate
that the Ferrieras were selling unregistered subdivided lands in Mineral Mountain Ranchos
Subdivision. The Ferrieras admit to selling the lots but deny that the sales were subject to
the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act.
Division of Real Estate brought this case against the Ferrieras by simultaneous
service of Notice of Adjudicative Proceeding (R. 1) and cease and desist order (R. 3)
claiming authority of §57-11 -13 and requiring the Ferrieras to stop seWing )ands in Mineral
Mountain Ranchos and the state of Utah until such lands were registered with them. The
Ferrieras submitted application to register in accordance with §57-11-5, 6, and 7 (R. 192);
Division did not respond in accordance with §57-11-9;
5

Judge scheduled exemption

hearing at the Ferrieras1 request (R. 13). The Ferrieras requested information about the
case and were denied (R. 14); The Ferrieras filed Motion to Exclude Present Escrow and
were denied (R. 19); A telephonic exemption hearing was held on February 24, 1997, (R.
353 - 483). Findings, conclusions and order were issued that subdivision is not exempt
(R. 484-494); Petition for Agency Review was filed (R. 495- 541). Request was made to
copy records and denied (R. 605-615) Order on Review (R. 623-634) says subdivision is
not exempt.
RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATIONS
The feasibility of Mineral Mountain Ranchos Subdivision, hereinafter called MMR,
was studied by Bullock Bros. Engineering Inc. in April of 1983 (Ferrieras' Exhibit 1,
R. 302-306) and prepared in accordance with the Division of Health Requirements (R.
302). The feasibility study shows that Cress Ferriera is the developer representative (R.
304) and that it was prepared in accordance with "requirements to Establish Feasibility of
Proposed Housing Subdivisions" as published by the Utah State Division of Health dated
January, 1971 (R. 305). The study includes a preliminary plat, showing contours,
proposed street and lot layouts and at R. 305 it says, "2. Individual homes in the
subdivision will receive water from private individual wells (R. 305)"; and at the time
MMR was approved, Ferriera had drilled one well on his property near the East 1/4
quarter corner of Section 22, T29S. R8W SLB&M.(R. 307). The study shows that water
6

from that well was tested by Southern Utah State College in February 1983 (R. 308-10)
(R. 113). On July 8, 1983 the approved map with official signatures was properly
recorded (R.191). Beaver county has a mobile home ordinance (R. 339) to "protect the
health, safety, and welfare of the present and future residents" (R. 339 Chapter 1). MMR
specifically allows mobile homes (R. 214 d) Over the years, four mobile homes have been
moved into MMR under building permits issued by Beaver County and the Southwest
Utah Division of Health. (R. 343) (R. 344) (R. 349) (R. 350)(R. 404-412).
A. Validity
The Division issued the order and started the formal adjudicative proceedings
"pursuant to investigation ..." (R. 3).
This order is not supported by the Land Sales Practices Act which is being claimed
as authority (R. 3).
The validity issue was brought up in court at (R. 357).
The Division tried to establish that the Ferrieras' failure to prove the exemption
issue would constitute an automatic validation of the cease and desist order (R. 362)
(R363. 22-24).
The Ferrieras preserved that issue in saying they are "... in no way prepared to
concede that it (if) the thing is not exempt that that order to cease and desist was validly
issued." (R. 364).
7

Ferriera relied on his knowledge of the Land Sales Practices Act and a face to face
conversation with the Division of Real Estate when he decided to bypass the registration
process in 1986 (R. 7-8).
According to Utah Code Ann. §57-11-21, the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices
Act "shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of
those states which enact it". The Utah act was patterned after the Model Land Sales
Practices Act (see addendum page marked 669). Ferreira relied on the intent and purpose
of the Land Sales Practices (R. 378).
The objective of the Utah version and the Model Act is "the prevention of fraud"
Wallis v. Thomas 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).
The Model Land Sales Practices Act was meant for subdivisions of more than 25
lots (Addendum page marked 674) Model Land Sales Practices Act (1.(6)); MMR has 22
lots (Division's Exhibit 12).
Targets of the Land Sales Practices Act are known as promotional subdivisions
(see comment following Model (1.(6) at page marked 675 of the addendum). Subdivisions
selling less than 25 separate lots per year are excluded (Model (3.(2), addendum page
marked 677).
B. The 1983 Exemption Language

8

The items discussed face to face with the Division in 1986 (R. 9) were the
condition of the title, the approval of the plat, and the absence of a promotional plan.
Ferriera phoned the division immediately after being served and was switched to David
Jones who turned the conversation away from these topics by questioning Ferriera about
the precise location he had visited in Salt Lake City ten years before. Mr. Jones said he
was working there at the time.

After that, Mr. Jones argued the applicability of the

statutory exemptions of the Land Sales Practices Act as they were before 1983, after
1983, and at present time. In conclusion, he told Ferriera the Division intended to call for
recision rights to all persons who bought lots from the Ferriera's during the 5 year period
immediately preceding the cease and desist order.
C. The 1993 v 1983 Exemption Language
The present wording of the exemption at §57-ll-4(l)(f) is different from what it
was in 1983 when MMR was approved under Title 17. The difference in the language is
not decisive but it weighs heavily on the interpretation of the present exemption language
of the Land Sales Practices Act. The difference between the two versions of
§57-1 l-4(l)(f) is essential to the Ferrieras' case.
Apparently the version cited by the Division as §57-11-1, et seq. (1993) is the
product of 1991 legislative session.

The wording seems to transfer a satisfactory

assurance of completion from the police power of the county ordinances to the subdivider
9

(Ferrieras' Exhibits 9,10, 13, and 14). However,

the transfer is arguable because the

assurance referred in the present exemption language is probably related to the granting of
a temporary permit under §57-11-5(2) and §57-M-7(l)(e)(iii). The alleged promise of
completion (R. 431-432) is non existent.
D. The 1993 Exemption Language
This is the same issue sometimes referred to in this case as the 1993 exemption.
The 1991 legislature changed 57-ll-4(l)(f) of the Land Sales Practices Act to make the
exemption dependent on the subdivided furnishing of satisfactory assurance of
completion of the improvements". That change is evident in Ch. 165 Laws of Utah 1991.
In that chapter it is not at all clear whether the new satisfactory assurance of completion
clause refers to a preexisting promise to complete or the one required in the public
offering statement at §57-ll-7(l)(e)(iii). Ferriera is sure it is the latter because it does
not make much sense the other way. However, that question needs to be answered by this
court not the Division of Real Estate because, clearly, it is a matter of law not agency
expertise.
Both of §57-11-4 and §57-11-7 were modified in the same time frame in
consecutive paragraphs of Laws of Utah, 1991 ch.165. Namely, §1 and §2. It would be
too self serving to allow the Division to use the satisfactory assurance of completion of

10

the improvements phrase to demonstrate a non existent promise to complete by the
subdivider.
The Division spawned its own unique interpretation of 1991, ch. 165, §1. The
facts about the 1993 exemption issue are plain. The Ferrieras say MMR is exempt from
registration at §57-ll-4(l)(f). The Division and the Administrative Law Judge say the
subdivision is not exempt because the Ferrieras have not provided "assurance of
completion of the improvements as to culinary water" The order on review says "the
Ferrieras agreed to supply culinary water to the lots in 1983" but did not do it and do not
intend to do it. The Ferrieras say the subdivision has culinary water and the exemption
language is not based on a requirement that the subdivider has to complete anything that is
not described in the POS.
In essence, the absence of a promise to complete made by the subdivider in a
public offering statement, automatically exempts the subdivision if it's located in a county
which has the facilities described in §57-ll-4(l)(f)(i) and §57-ll-4(l)(f)(ii) regardless of
the improvements providing it will have telephone and electricity when it is complete.
E. Constitutionality
The cease order was based on exemption issue "which are not exempt" (R. 3).

11

The Division started formal adjudicative proceeding on the same they issued the
cease and desist order (R. 1). Section §57-11-13 does not authorize the Division to start
adjudicative proceedings.
The emergency order is not in compliance with §63-46b-20(2)(b) because they did
not state any reason for starting using emergency proceedings in the order (R. 1-3)
Division acknowledged the validity issue by inviting the Ferrieras to "contest this
cease and desist order" (R. 1).
The court confirmed the existence of

the validity issue by using it to deny

Ferriera's motion to exclude a preexisting escrow (R. 357).
The Division tried to validate the cease and desist order by insisting that if the
subdivision were found not exempt, the order would be valid automatically (R. 363).
Ferriera objected to automatic validation (R. 364).
Ferriera requested information about what provoked the problem (R. 14).
The Division resorted to a formal adjudicative proceeding so they could rely on it to
withhold information regarding the investigation pursuant to the order (R. 17)
(R. 606-615).
Ferreira could not argue the validity of the order at the exemption hearing because
he did not know why it was issued in the first place (R. 363)

12

The court tried to force Ferriera to testify on the validity of the order anyway
which brought 12 pages of argument (R. 363-375)
The argument was concluded by the court's allowing the Ferrieras to reserve the
validity issue (R.376).
The Administrative Law Judge and the Executive Director of the Department of
Commerce have issued final orders upholding the cease and desist orders..
F. Due Process
The Division issued emergency order under §63-46b-20 and claimed authority
under §57-11-13 (R. 563)
The order is defective because it doesn't give any reason for emergency action
even though the statement of any reason is required at §63-46b-20(2)(b).
They concealed that it was an emergency order until Ferreira reasoned it out
and faced them with it (R. 507).
Eventually, the Division admitted they had used the emergency procedures
of§63-46b-20(R. 564).
They asked their superior agency to disregard the due process issue (R. 561)
They are still trying to deny due process to the Ferrieras by claiming the Ferrieras
waived their rights (R. 562).

13

The Administrative Law Judge offered them a post judgment hearing but he
admitted he is prejudiced by saying "This court remains convinced that the September 30,
1996 Order was issued in full compliance with procedural requirements mandated by
§57-11-13 (R. 107)
G. The Registration Issue
The Division received a fully executed and paid up application to Register the
subdivision from the Ferriera's on October 25, 1996 (R. 605).
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1 l-9(l)(a) through §57-1 l-9(l)(c) provides:
1) (a) Upon receipt of the application for registration in proper form, the
division shall issue a notice of filing to the applicant within five business
days of the date of receipt of application.
(b) Within 30 days from the date of the notice of filing, or, if no notice of
filing is issued within the time required, within 35 days from the date of
receipt of the application, the division shall register the subdivided lands or
reject the registration.
(c) If the division has not entered the rejection within 30 days from the date
of notice of filing, the land is considered registered unless the applicant has
consented in writing to a delay.

None of the above described notices have been received by the Ferrieras.
The Division has neither granted nor denied the application (R. 487) (R. 593).
H. Recision Rights
The Division's letter dated December 2, 1996 makes retroactive recision rights and
other things a prerequisite for registration (R. 40).
14

Retroactive recision rights are not a statutory requirement under 57-11-8(1). There
is no statutory grant of discretion to the agency in this regard.
The Division does not understand the diflference between sales contracts and real
estate purchase contracts and the importance of that diflference to the Land Sales Practices
Act (R. 53-54) (R. 73-74)
I. The Right to Close Escrow
The Ferrieras filed Motion to Exclude Present Escrow from the Cease and Desist
Order on January 23, 1997 (R. 19-41) including exhibits and attachments intended to
demonstrate to the court that the Ferrieras had faithfully and conscientiously fulfilled all
statutory requirements for registration of the subdivision.
The value of the escrow was $38,500 (R. 24) The title to be transferred was for
three water rights and all utilities including a 25 gallon per minute well (R. 24, 1.1). Seller
was to insure the title and convey it under the usual warranty deed subject only to a note
and first deed of trust. The buyer was to have a seven day right of recision under the
standard Utah REPC (R. 24).
Section §63-46b-20(2)(a) reads as follows:
(a) limit its order to require only the action necessary to prevent
or avoid the danger to the public health, safety, or welfare (Emphasis
added).

The court denied the motion based on fuzzy logic (R. 357)
15

ARGUMENT FOR THE EXEMPTION ISSUE
The Land Sales Practices Act, being relied upon by the Utah Division of Real
Estate does not support the Division's action against the Ferrieras. It is patterned after the
Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Land Sales Practices Act (see addendum but page
numbers therein are not related to page numbers in the index of the record) The Land
Sales Practices Act was known as the Utah Uniform Land and Timeshare Sales Practices
Act until 1987. After that it became known as the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act.
Both versions of the Act are based on the 1966 Uniform Land Sales Practices Act which
has been adopted in substance by most of the United States. Utah was the tenth state to
adopt it. Clearly, the Model Act is focused on the manner in which lands are sold not the
manner in which they are subdivided. Apparently, the Division was not aware of origin
and purpose of the Land Sales Practices Act. If they were, they should not have cited it
against the Ferrieras because Mineral Mountain Ranchos is not a promotional subdivision.
The Land Sales Practices Act is essential to the protection of the unskilled and
inexperienced residential property buyer who might otherwise be taken in by the false
promises and suede shoe sales tactics sometimes used by unscrupulous real estate
promoters. The Division's duty under The Land Sales Practices Act is to enforce the
production of an elaborate detailed disclosures regarding the character of the land and the
resources of the sellers which disclosure is referred to as a public offering statement
16

(§57-11-17) or a POS (R41). Under §57-11-12 the Division is empowered to investigate
the correctness of the POS but nothing in the Land Sales Practices Act authorizes the
Division to evaluate the fitness or the completenessof any subdivision improvement. That
duty is reserved unto the County officials under Title 17 as referenced at

§57-11-6(1)0X0
The exemption language of the Land Sales Practices Act is designed to minimize
administrative costs by excluding the vast majority of subdivisions from its jurisdiction
(see prefatory note in addendum). Contrary to the Division's thoughts of record expressed
in various phrases such as "entitled to an exemption" "not deserve an exemption" and in
the record (R. 465), the exemptions are not there to provide an escape hatch for sleazy
developers. Mineral Mountain Ranchos, hereinafter MMR, is purposely exempt from The
Land Sales Practices Act by, title, definition, and statutes as well as by the intent and
purpose of the Model Act because the legislature wants to minimize administrative costs.
DETAILS OF THE EXEMPTION ARGUMENT
A. Validity Argument
Respondent ordered the Ferrieras to stop selling subdivided lands in Mineral
Mountain Ranchos until such lands are properly registered under provisions of §57-11-1,
et seq (R4). The findings upon which the September 30, 1996 order is based state that the
Ferrieras are "engaging in acts constituting violations of the Land Sales Practices Act".
17

The only three ways of violating this chapter are listed at §57-11-17(1 )(a), (b), and
(c) as follows:
(a) refers to §57-11-5 which has four subsections all pertaining to
"subdivided lands;"
(b) refers to untrue statements of material facts in disposing of
"subdivided lands;"
(c) refers to omitting a material fact in disposing of "subdivided
lands."

The definition of "subdivided lands" given at §57-11-2 (9) is "ten or more units
offered as part of a common promotional plan". In the absence of a promotional plan the
lands mentioned are not subdivided lands regardless of the number of lots involved. None
of the land referred to in the order is identifiable as "subdivided lands" within the meaning
of the Land Sales Practices Act because there is no promotional plan. The Ferrieras admit
to selling lots in MMR but they deny selling "subdivided lands". Unless the Division had
already proved that the lands being sold by the Ferrieras are subdivided lands within the
meaning of the Land Sales Practices Act, they had no "reason to believe "that the
above-named Respondents have been, and are, engaging in acts constituting
violation of the Utah Land Sales Practices Act,f (R. 3). Therefore, they had no
authority to issue a cease and order in this case.
In their letter dated December 2, 1996 (R41. 4). The Division states that "The
Public Offering Statement (POS) you submitted is acceptable and may be used for this
18

offering". That approved document says that MMR was not to be sold under a
"promotion plan" so none was undertaken (R. 35) That document was approved by the
Division of Real Estate itself (R. 41).
The definition of "promotion" given in the New Lexicon Webster's Encyclopedic
Dictionary, 1989, is "a striving to secure greater sales by intensive advertising".
The Administrative Law Judge found only three lots sold on November 17, 1995
(R.102). However there were seven sold on that date because two of the buyers wanted
10 acre sites (two five acre lots each ) and one wanted a fifteen acre site (three five acre
lots).
Nevertheless, the court should wonder how the Division could believe that three
lot sales in the entire year of 1995 could be the result of an intensive plan of advertising.
The Ferrieras conclusion is that the Division well knew MMR is not a promotional
subdivision and they only wanted to see how much trouble they could make for the
Ferrieras by tying up their real estate.
In order to cancel any possible inferences of a common promotional plan in MMR,
we reconciled the sales or record in this proceeding to the following tabulation:
MMR is 22 lots of 5 Acres each (Division's Exhibit 12). The record shows that during
the five years preceding the September 30, 1996 cease and desist order, the Ferrieras sold
1) One lot to Robert and Sharon Andrew on July 1, 1996 (Division's Exhibit 18);
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2) Two lots to Douglas Parker November 24, 1995 Division's Exhibit 19;
3) Three lots to Jon Fry on November 24, 1995 Division's Exhibit 20);
4) Two lots to Steven Scandell on November 30, 1995 Division's Exhibit 21;
5) Two lots to David Fry on November 24, 1995 Division's Exhibit 22,
6) Two lots to Phil Ivey on May 21, 1995 Division's Exhibit 25
7) One lot to Gayle Cooney on May 24, 1994 Division's Exhibit 24
8) One lot to Ross Low on June 20, 1994 Division's Exhibit 26;
During those five years there was one transaction in 1996, five transactions in
1995 and two transactions in 1994. In all, fourteen lots were sold during those five years
but only 8 transactions because most of the buyers preferred ten acres home sites and
bought two lots each. Two lots had been sold before that five year period and at the time
of the cease and desist order two other lots were in escrow leaving four lots unsold at the
time of the order. From time of its approval in 1983 until the date of the order in 1996
there were eleven dispositions as defined at §57-11-2(1). This can not be seen as the result
of

any common promotional plan by any stretch of the imagination The tabulation

averages out to about one sale every 15 months. Moreover, every last sale was made to
local people or a friend or relative of a local person. No sale was ever made from
advertising. By definition, the Utah Land Sales Practices Act does not apply to any of the
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lands mentioned in this case, because there is no evidence that the Ferrieras had any
common plan of promotion.
The Division also ordered the Ferrieras to stop offering or selling the four 40 acre
parcels adjacent to MMR. However, these parcels are not part of a common promotional
plan of advertising and sale. They are not subdivided lands within the meaning of the
Land Sales Practices Act (R. 4).
The Division ordered the Ferrieras to stop offering or selling land in this State but
the Ferrieras have not offered or sold any land in the State of Utah under a common
promotional plan of advertising and sale. The order does not apply to anything the
Ferrieras have ever done with real estate.
No single paragraph describes the Land Sales Practices Act better than the
eleventh paragraph written by Chief Justice Maugham in Wallis v Thomas 632 P.2d 39
which says:
"In construing this Act, the focus should be on its objective, i.e., the
regulation of subdivided lands was designed for the prevention of fraud and
sharp practices in a type of real estate transaction peculiarly open to such
abuses."

The few lots involved in the entire subdivision, only 22 in all, the few sales made
in MMR, and the absence of any promotional plan, exclude this tract of land from the
kind of subdivision that is "peculiarly open to such abuses."
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Section §57-11-21 of the Utah Land Sales Practices Act provides:
"This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose
to make uniform the law of those states which enact it."

As noted by Chief Justice Maugham in the Wallis v Thomas case, the Utah
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act effective August 1, 1973, with certain modifications,
follows the Model Act. The Ferrieras realize that Utah did not include the following
section in its codification of the Act. The purpose in citing it here is to address the
comments following the section in the same way as Chief Justice Maughan did in Wallis v
Thomas when he cited the comment following section (3)(1) of the Model Act
(addendum page marked 677).

The Ferrieras make the citation at this point to

demonstrate the intent and purpose of the act not to invoke it as controlling authority.
Subsection 3(2) of the Model Act (addendum 677) provides an exemption if
"fewer than [25] separate parcels , units, or interests in subdivided lands are offered by a
person in a period of [12] months;"
The Comment that follows the exemption reads as follows:
This exemption will exclude all locally oriented offerings and will
allow the seller to take advantage of the exemption even though the
subdivision may be large enough to qualify , by restricting the amount of
land offered for disposition. In order to qualify under this exemption, the
owner must not only refrain from selling, but must refrain from offering
the requisite number of lots for sale.
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It is reasonably obvious that the Utah Legislators, in revising the Land Sales
Practices Act at Laws of Utah, 1983, ch. 255, §2, purposely incorporated the "fewer than
[25] separate parcel" exemption into the definition language by substituting the phrase
"including land" for the phrase "and also includes any land" in the first sentence of
§57-11-2(9) as shown below. In this way, they were able to eliminate section 3(2) of the
Model,

maintain the full substance of The Act, and fulfill the purpose of uniformity

expressed at §57-11-21. 1983, ch. 255, §2, Laws of Utah which reads::
(6) "Subdivision" and "subdivided lands" means [any]-land which is
divided or is proposed to be divided for the purpose of disposition into ten
or more units [and also includes any] including land^ whether contiguous
or notj f ten or more units are offered as a part of a common promotional
plan of advertising and sale. [Where any] If a subdivision is offered by a
[single] developer[7] or [ft] group of developers [acting in concert], and
[that] the land is contiguous or is known, designated, or advertised as a
common tract or by a common name, that land [shall be] is presumed,
without regard to the number of units covered by each individual offering,
to be part of a common promotional plan:

It also can be seen from the foregoing that the purpose of the authority being
claimed by the Division (§57-11-1, et seq) is to supervise the manner in which lands
are sold not the manner in which they are subdivided.
The Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act does not apply to MMR because
there is no plan of promotion.
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It should be noted that the Wallis v Thomas case took place in 1981 and the
decision therein was based on the definition of subdivided land as it stood in 1981 not as it
is now in 1998. As that definition stands now and has stood for the last 15 years, MMR is
not included in the Land Sales Practices Act because it does not now have and never has
had a common plan of promotion.
B. The 1983 Exemption Argument
MMR is clearly exempt at §57-ll-(4)(l)(f) as it stood in 1983 because this
exemption simply provides that subdivided lands that are subject to county ordinances
which assure an orderly development of the improvements are exempt from the provisions
of the Land Sales Practices Act. The Division does not want to understand that their only
authority under the act is to enforce and monitor the production and distribution of a
detailed disclosure statement. Their duty is not to evaluate subdivisions Conformance to
building standards is the responsibility of the county. Evaluation is the buyer's privilege.
The Division agreed (R. 391) that all conditions of the 1993 exemption language
exist in Mineral Mountain Ranchos except that it doesn't have culinary water R-104. The
common basis of all their conclusions and final orders is that the exemption requires the
subdivider to provide satisfactory assurance of completion of the culinary water (R.
431). The 1983 exemption language does not include the word subdivider nor does it in
any way imply that the subdivider shall furnish satisfactory assurance of completion of
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anything. The 1983 exemption language used the same words as the 1993 exemption does
but the earlier version did not imply that subdivider is required to furnish satisfactory
assurance of completion as demonstrated in Ferrieras' Exhibits 9 and 10. The Ferrieras'
understanding of the 1983 language is simply that the state will not require a POS if the
County Ordinances assure completion of the off-site improvements. MMR was designed
in favor of Mobile Homes (R. 214, d.), Beaver County has a Mobile Home Ordinance
(Ferrieras1 Exhibit 11, R. 339-342), and MMR is properly approved under Title 11
(Division's Exhibit 12).
The Division agreed that ail con&hons cS tne *Y99i exemption aie'hSiry TneViTi
MMR except, as \o
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the 1983 statutes could can not be ojiestioaed without cefeceace ta t&& 1991 ^ta£u.t£&
which of course had not yet been conceived.
C. The 1983 v 1993 Exemption Argument
To establish that "no operative difference" (R. 105) exists between the two
versions of §57-ll-4(l)(f)

the division had to assume an expertise in the definition of

culinary water and a statutory right to determine that the subdivider is responsible for
assurance of its existence in the affected land. They do not have the expertise on water
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and they do not have a statutory grant of discretion to determine that the subdivider is
responsible for the assurance.
The Ferrieras assert that the county ordinances adequately assure that no home
will be occupied unless the owner of the home provides himself with culinary water
service. The Division is trying to say the subdivider has to provide the culinary water
service in order to fit the terms of the exemption language. The county was satisfied that
culinary water was generally available throughout the subdivision when they approved it
and they were confident that no one could live in the subdivision without either drilling his
own well or hooking up to a neighbors well. All they wanted to know was that each lot
owner would be provided with a water right which would authorize him to apply for a
permit from the state engineer to drill his own well if he so desired. The ordinances make
it clear that, without a source of culinary water, no building permit will be issued. The
difference between the 1983 version and the 1993 versions of the exemption is an illusion
that appears only if the present version is misread with an incorrect definition of culinary
water in mind. Culinary water is not culinary water service.

The present exemption

language is the product of 1991 legislature. In actuality, the wording only appears to
transfer a satisfactory assurance of completion from the police power of the county
ordinances onto the subdivider (Ferrieras' exhibits 9, 10, ). The Division is relying on a
false definition of culinary water to establish a necessity for the satisfactory assurance of
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completion which they are trying to impose on the Ferrieras. If they are allowed to
establish that culinary water and culinary water service mean the same thing , they think
they can prove to us that there is no operative difference between the two versions of the
exemption and thereby prove that the subdivider has always had an obligation to furnish
satisfactory assurance of completion even in 1983, under which language,

MMR

obviously is exempt.
In the final analysis, there being no factual evidence to show the existence of a
promise to complete (R. 412),

the satisfactory assurance of completion phrase is

meaningless. Even though the difference is based on an incorrect definition of culinary
water, Ferriera needs to reserve a right to rely on the 1983 version of the exemption if he
is required to preserve the argument that the subdivision was exempt at the time it was
approved under Title 17 in 1983.
D. The 1993 Exemption Argument
The agency has created an illusionary interpretation of the exemption language but
the legislature did not grant the division any right of discretion in the interpretation of that
statute. In Chevron v State Tax Commission. 847 P.2d 418, the court states in its standard
of review that "We do not defer to an agency's statutory interpretation unless the
legislature has explicitly, or implicitly, granted the agency discretion to interpret the
statutory language at issue." emphasis added.
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In our case, the agencies illusionary interpretation was created by the following
conclusions of the administrative law judge and the Executive Director of the Department
of Commerce..
(R. 487) "failed to provide satisfactory assurance of completion of the improvements for
culinary water"
(R. 489) "the subdivider would be required to provide assurance of completion of those
improvements"
(R. 489) "the improvements ... must consist ... of a well on each lot ... or a delivery
system.
(R. 490) "assurance of completion of the improvements as to culinary water"
(R. 631) "Subdivider agreed to supply culinary water to the lots"
The code exemption calls for culinary water all right but all of the forgoing refer to
an illusion of culinary water. Culinary water is a natural attribute of the land not an
illusion. The Administrative Law Judge has reached other conclusions that are neither
logical nor supported by statute. For example, he said that the subdivided efforts in
regards to providing culinary water "cannot be reasonably construed

(R. 105) to

constitute completion of the improvements as that phrase is used in §57-ll-4(l)(f)." He
went even further when he said "clearly the improvements in question must necessarily
consist of either the construction of a well on each lot to actually provide culinary
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water for that lot or the completion of a delivery system whereby water from an
adjoining lot is available to the lot in question (R. 105) (R. 431) (R. 409). The Judge
is describing culinary water services but that is not what the code calls for.
The Division is arguing that culinary water service means the same thing as
culinary water means in the exemption language (R. 396, 397). Nevertheless
§57-ll-4(l)(f)(iii)

specifically

calls

for

"culinary

§57-ll-(4)(l)(f)(ii); not culinary water service.

water"

by

reference

to

Wherever the code means culinary

water service, it refers to it by that specific phrase as in

§57-11-4(3 )(a)(i),

§57-ll-4(3)(a)(ii), §57-11-4(3)(b)(i), and §57-ll-6(l)(o)(i). The two phrases are not
synonymous. Culinary water is household water that may be drawn from a river, stream,
lake, or well, by bucket on a rope, a windmill, a gas powered pump, an electric powered
pump, or in special instances, hauled out from town on a tank truck . Culinary water is a
natural attribute of the land that is available to the inhabitants of the land for household
use as long as it is accessed in a way that is approved by ordinances of the county, the
local health department, and the state engineer.
Culinary water service, on the other hand, means water piped to each dwelling
from a common source in some way similar to what the judge is describing above. That
kind of water supply must be evaluated by the Health Department (R. 413) or some
agency other than the Division of Real Estate.
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The difference between the terms is exemplified in Paulson v Hooper
Water Imp. DisU 656 P.2d 459, (Utah 1982) as follows:
"After trial, the trial court found that, even though the defendant had
installed main culinary water lines adjacent to the area in question, the
installation and "availability" of water is not the same as furnishing
culinary water services to the plaintiffs' land. Thus, the court entered a
finding that the defendant "was not, at the date of the filing of the petition,
furnishing culinary water service to the territory sought to be withdrawn.
(Emphasis added.)

The §57-ll-4(l)(f) exemption being relied on by the Ferrieras is based on the
availability (R. 401) of culinary water not culinary water service. There is no explicit
grant of discretion in this section of the code, under which the Division of Real Estate can
assume the expertise needed to determine that the code means culinary water service
when it clearly says culinary water. The Division is not constituted to decide that the
culinary water called for in §57-ll-(4)(l)(f) means that water must be piped to or
available from a private well on each lot at the time of sale in order to declare the
subdivision exempt. Obviously, the division is still building on its own illusion by saying,
"the improvements in question must necessarily consist of either the construction of a well
on each lot to actually provide culinary water for that lot or of the completion (R. 431) of
a delivery system whereby water from an adjoining lot is available to the lot in question
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R. 105). Under any light, the judge is clearly mistaken because the exemption language at
§57-1 l-4(l)(f) calls for assurance of completion not completion. The existence of
underground water was all the assurance the county needed for approval of the
subdivision. If anything else had been required by the Beaver County Commissioners, they
would have called for a performance bond; that they did not do (R. 432).
Moreover, an assurance of completion is not justifiable without a promise to
complete and none was requested or given (R. 431-432). If the subdivider is the one who
is supposed to provide the assurance that promise would have had to come from the
subdivider in order for it to be binding upon him.
The court says that "that assurance would come from the subdivider" (R. 105)and
the Department rubber stamped it by saying "subdivider obtained approval of the Mineral
Mountain Ranchos by the planning commission based upon representations that culinary
water would be provided by the Ferrieras at each lot in the subdivision" (R. 628). They
issued their order of noncompliance on an alleged existence of the subdividers promise to
complete a culinary water improvement that they perceive to be either a well on each lot in
the subdivision or a piped water delivery system.
The facts are:
September 22, 1981, the Division of Water Rights recommends .45 acre Ft.
(Ferrieras' Exhibit. 5, R. 331) per family.
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April, 1983, Bullock Brothers Feasibility Study says, "Individual homes in this
subdivision will receive water from private individual wells" (Ferrieras' Exhibit 1, R. 305).
April, 1983, Bullock Brothers Feasibility Study says "Private individual wells will
serve this subdivision" (Ferrieras' Exhibit 1, R. 305).
April, 1983), Bullock Brothers Feasibility Study says, "Individual water wells are
anticipated as sources of supply for each lot and a statement from the Utah State Engineer
is attached which discusses feasibility of obtaining ground water" (Ferrieras' Exhibit 1, R.
305).
April 20, 1983, Preliminary plat map is approved by County Commission
contingent on a letter from the Health Department (Division's Exhibit 1).
April 20, 1983, County Commission motion carried to rezone from MU 10 to A-5
(Division's Exhibit 1).
May 10, 1983, Southwest Utah District Health Department acknowledged the
subdivider's proposal "that individual wells be drilled by each individual purchasing
property" emphasis added (Ferrieras' Exhibit 4, R. 327).
May 10, 1983, that individual wells be drilled by each individual purchasing
property" emphasis added. Feasibility statement acknowledged the subdivider's proposal
"that individual wells be drilled by each individual purchasing property" (emphasis
added) and said that such water supply is feasible (Ferrieras' Exhibit 4, R 328)
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June 10, 1983, notice of public hearing on petition to rezone.
(Ferrieras' Exhibit 2, R. 325).
June 13, 1983,

public hearing on petition to rezone held without

protest

(Division's Exhibit 4, R. 114).
June 13, 1983, the zoning ordinance adopted (Ferrieras' Exhibit 3, R. 326).
June 15, 1983, Planning Commission required .73 Acre Ft for each 5 acres in
stead of the proposed .45 and Ferriera cut down the number of lots to 25 so he would
have enough water for the whole subdivision (Ferrieras' Exhibit 6, R. 332).
July 6, 1983, revised map of MMR presented and accepted by the planning
commission (Division's Exhibit 3).
July 7, 1983,

revised map of MMR presented and accepted by the County

Commissioners (Division's Exhibit 5).
July 8, 1983, approved map of the subdivision is recorded (Division's Exhibit 12).
The foregoing being all the evidence of contacts between the Beaver County
Officials and the Ferrieras prior to and including final approval and recording of the plat
map, and there being substantial and credible evidence comprised therein that Beaver
County as well as the Health Department knew and accepted Ferriera's plans for culinary
water wherein each purchaser would drill his own well (R.403), and there being no
evidence at all of a promise by subdivider to drill any wells or complete anything
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whatever, then it should be concluded that the Division of Real Estate and the Department
of Commerce conjured up or deliberately prevaricated respectively that Ferriera got the
subdivision approved by Beaver County on the basis of

a promise to complete the

Division's illusion of culinary water.
Moreover, the Southwest Utah Division of Health Feasibility Statement on date of
May 10, 1983, says, that individual wells be drilled by each individual purchasing
property". It does not say that individual wells wil be drilled on each lot as conjured up in
the Division's illusion of culinary water.
Furthermore, the foregoing facts are clear and concise in the matter of the zoning
that was changed to A-5 to accommodate the subdivision. It should be obvious to the
Division that their illusion of culinary water is not compatible with agricultural zoning
where most people own 10 acres or more. Those are farms not lots. The incompatibility of
culinary water service in A-5 zoning as well as the impracticality of drilling wells prior to
sales has been demonstrated adequately to the Division by the Ferrieras (R. 588-589).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT FOR DUE PROCESS
The division thinks the Ferrieras acts "constitute a threat to the public welfare"
The Land Sales Practices Act authorizes the agency to issue a cease and desist order if the
subdivider doesn't register lands that are not exempt and it gives the agency a right to sue
the subdivider in district court if he doesn't obey the order but the Land Sales Practices
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Act does not provide the agency with a discretionary right to secretly determine whether
or not an act is a threat to the public welfare. The Utah version of the Land Sales Practices
Act does not even authorize the agency to decide whether or not an order should be an
emergency order as opposed to an informal cease and desist order. The Act is perfectly
clear on this matter. An emergency order may be issued only under §57-1 l-10(2)(c).
Contrary to what the agency avers, the overt act of selling unregistered lots that are
thought to be exempt can not be reasonably construed to constitute a threat to the public
welfare even if the agency did have a discretionary right in that regard.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT FOR DUE PROCESS
E, Constitutionality Argument
The Division claimed authority under §57-11-13 but that section does not support
emergency orders. The validity issue is before this court because the agency failed to find
support for their order in Ferriera's testimony on the exemption issue. On the other hand,
if Ferreira had contested the validity or the orders instead of the exemption issue the
Division would have construed his request for hearing the cease and desist into an
admission of nonexempt status. Ferriera couldn't contest the Cease and Desist order
directly because he does not know what facts they relied on when the issued the order.
The Division is still withholding all information leading up to the issuance of the order.
They knew and took advantage of the fact that Ferriera could not challenge the validity of
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phantom allegations. The Ferrieras think that anyone holding a position of authority in the
Division of Real Estate ought to know enough about The Land Sales Practices Act to
have realized from the start that MMR is not subject to that act even without an
investigation. There being no authority in the act to issue an emergency cease and desist
order for failure to register an allegedly nonexempt subdivision, the Ferrieras thought the
Division might be harboring some other kind of grievance by mistake. The Ferrieras were
entitled to an opportunity to dispel such grievance if one existed The Ferrieras are asking
for reverse of the cease and order under §63-46b-16(4)(a) because the Division's use of
§57-11-1 et seq. is unconstitutional on its face or as applied.
There is no doubt that the Division did in fact start emergency proceedings under
§63-46b-20 as charged by the Ferrieras (R. 508) and admitted by Division. (R. 563)
Emergency proceedings are not authorized under §57-11-13 which is the only
section they cited as authority for issuing the order. The only justification for invoking
§63-46b-20 is the existence of an "immediate and significant danger to the public health,
safety, or welfare" as spelled out at §63-46b-20(l)(a). MMR is not an immediate and
significant danger requiring immediate action by the agency. However, that condition must
be present in order to justify such an order according to §63-46b-20(l)(a). Without such
justification, it s clear that "the agency acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any
statutes ". The Ferrieras are entitled to relief under §63-46b-16(4)(b).
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Section §57-11-13 plainly says that if the Director thinks something is wrong, he
can issue an order, hear the other side, and then make the order permanent if he finds then
is a violation. Nothing in this section or any other section of the Land Sales Practices Act
gives the agency any authority to issue an emergency cease and desist order against an
unregistered subdivision. The Division may resort to Title 63 in cases of fraudulent
behavior, (§57-11-14), enforcement of renewal reports, (§57-11-10), in any of its
administrative proceedings (§57-11-3.5), or, as in (§57-11-13) (l)(d), "if the person
served requests a hearing," (Emphasis added.). The Ferrieras have not requested a
hearing on the cease and desist order because they do not know why the emergency ordei
was issued. If §57-11-13 et seq. can be construed to be a proper authority for the
procedure the Division used herein, then that section is indeed "unconstitutional on its fac<
or as applied." The Ferrieras are therefore entitled to relief under §63-46b-16(4)(a)
which does not require deference to the agency.
For example, §57-11-21 Reads as follows:
This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it." (Emphasis added.)

The Model Land Sales Practices Act cited in Wallis v Thomas by Chief Justici
Maughan is included in the addendum at addendum page 693 and reads in part as follows:
§ 12. [Cease and Desist Orders]
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(a) If the agency determines after notice and hearing (emphasis
added) that a person has:
(1) violated any provision of this Act:
(2) directly of through an agent or employee knowingly engaged in
any false, deceptive, or misleading advertising, promotional, or sales
methods to offer or dispose of an interest in subdivided lands;
(3) made any substantial change in the plan of disposition and
development of the subdivided lands subsequent to the order of registration
without obtaining prior written approval from the agency;
(4) disposes of any lands which have not been registered with the
agency; or
(5) violated any lawful order or rule of the agency;
it may issue an order requiring the person to cease and desist from the
unlawful practice and to take such affirmative action as in the judgment of
the agency will carry out the purposes of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
COMMENT

Copied from section 478.161, Florida Statutes.
(b) if the agency makes a finding of fact in writing that the public
interest will be irreparably harmed by delay in issuing an order, it may issue
a temporary cease and desist order. Prior to issuing the temporary cease
and desist order, the agency whenever possible by telephone or otherwise
shall give notice of the proposal to issue a temporary cease and desist order
to the person. Ever temporary cease and desist order shall include in its
terms a provision that upon request a hearing will be held [promptly]
[within
] to determine whether or not it becomes permanent.

This language of the Model Act (not the comment) was imported verbatim into the
Utah Uniform Land Sales And Time Share Act in 1977 and remained intact until replaced
by its present version in 1991.
It is the present version that has caused this judicial review not the former one. The
agency should have phoned the Ferrieras before they issued the order. Petitioners' phone
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number has been in the Beaver county phone book for many years and the number
automatically forwards to their home/office in California. Either our present version of
the 57-11-13 is defective or section 57-11-21 which promises uniformity is false. One or
the other is sorely in need of revision.
F. Due Process Argument
The Division is determined to challenge the Ferrieras right to due process. The
Division has not followed the rules in this case since they started it on September 30,
1996. The cease and desist order is defective in several ways:
a) It is premised on alleged violations of §56-11-1 et seq. which act does not
apply to the Ferrieras by intent and purpose;
b) An emergency order is not authorized under § 57-11-13 under which they
claimed;
c) An emergency order is not valid except in specific circumstances related to
immediate and significant danger and in any event the danger has to be spelled out in the
order according to (§63-46b-20(l)(a) and (2)(b). None of this was done (R. 1-3) but they
admit to using an emergency order (R. 564);
d) Ferriera is denied access to all information leading up to the issuance of the
cease and desist order (R. 606-615).
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e) When the Ferrieras requested review, the Division asked their superior agency
to disregard the due process issue (R. 561).
f) They are still trying to stop the Ferrieras from getting due process under the law
by trying to convince everyone that they waived their right to due process (R. 561) by not
requesting Judge Eklund to hear the due process issue after he issued his final order.
The Ferrieras can not believe they waived their rights to due process by not letting
Judge Eklund hear it inasmuch as he said he was already convinced that the Division had
followed correct procedures (R. 107).
The Ferrieras' income has been stopped for 16 months on account of the
unauthorized cease and desist order and the adjudicative proceedings started by the
Division of Real Estate.
The Ferrieras are entitled to relief under §63-46b-16(4).
G* The Registration Argument
There is no doubt that the Ferrieras filed complete application to register the
subdivision within a few days after they became aware that the Division considered MMR
not to be exempt because of a change in the exemption language There can be no doubt
that that the Division still has the Ferrieras' completed application in their possession
together with the Ferrieras' registration money. The can be no doubt that the Division has
neither denied nor registered Ferriera's application.
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Obviously, the division never intended to register the subdivision because they
knew it was not subject to the Land Sales Practices in the first place and they knew is was
exempt at §57-1 l-4(l)(f). The purpose of the cease and desist order was to delve into the
Ferriera's personal affairs. Ferrieras bring this to issue because they believe they are
entitled to relief under §63-46b-16(4)(e) simply because the agency "failed to follow
prescribed procedure."
H. Retroactive Recision Rights Argument
There can be no doubt that the Division's letter to the Ferrieras Dated
December 2, 1996 advised the Ferrieras of the Division's intention to delay registration
of the subdivision as long as possible if not forever (R. 40). Everything they mentioned
had already been provided to them in the application and the POS which they approved in
that same letter.
They brought the retroactive recision rights up again because they knew that was
the one thing Ferriera would not do (R. 7-8). Ferriera is absolutely sure that no present lot
owner wants to "rescind" his deal. If anyone should become dissatisfied in the future they
have a right to recovery through a civil procedure under 57-11-17(2).
For the Division to require a blanket offer of recision rights as a condition of
registration is unreasonable and unfair inasmuch as it would appear to everyone receiving
such an offer that possibly Ferreira had done something wrong. Title 57 does not
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authorize the Division of Real Estate to make any such judgment or to place such a burden
on anyone.
I. The Right to Close Escrow Argument
Under an emergency cease and desist order the agency is required to limit its
actions to those required to avoid any immediate and significant danger. This would have
been good and sufficient reason for granting the Ferrieras motion to exclude the present
escrow from the cease and desist order.

However, the Division deliberately and

wrongfully concealed the facts of the emergency procedure form the Ferrieras.

The

Division did not reference §63-46b-20 in it cease and desist order and it did not
demonstrate any requirement for immediate action. The Division successfully concealed
these facts until August 8, 1997 (R. 564) six months after Ferriera's motion to exclude
the present escrow R. 19) Their deception was deliberate and premeditated.
The administrative law judge denied the motion to exclude the present escrow on
vague grounds (R. 357). If the Ferrieras had been able to present that motion in light of
§63-46b-20(2)(a), it might have had a better chance for survival.
By falsely claiming authority for emergency action under §57-11-13 (R. 3 ) the
Division cost the Ferrieras a bare minimum of $38,500. Therefore the substantial prejudice
requirement of §63-46b-16(4) is clearly met.
CONCLUSIONS AND STATEMENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT
42

Mineral Mountain ranchos is not a promotional subdivision because it does not
have a common plan of promotion. It is exempt because there is no promise to complete
anything beyond what is already in place. The division violated due process when it issued
an emergency cease and desist order without grounds.
The essence of this case is due process. The Division served an emergency cease
and desist order against the petitioners without a hearing and without stating the reasons
for the agency's utilization of emergency adjudicative proceedings
The Division stated the reason for the order was failure to register a subdivision
but when Petitioners did register the subdivision, immediately after the order, the Division
would not complete the registration on grounds that subdivider must first furnish blanket
five year retroactive recision rights to everyone even though all those sales were made by
conveyance of insured title, not by land sales contracts, and none of the buyers are
dissatisfied with their purchases.
The Division deliberately and repeatedly withheld information about events leading
up to the issuance of the order which might have allowed the Ferriera to contest it or
correct any alleged problem. Division would not permit the close of a valuable preexisting
escrow even though the emergency order required them to limit their restrictive actions.
The administrative law judge tried to beat Ferreira down on the due process issue
by challenging him to argue the law with him word by word even while Ferreira was in
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the act of demonstrating to the Division that the lands are exempt by definition and by
statutory language. When petitioner objected to argument about due process until after
the exemption hearing, the judge privately ruled against him and issued a final order
without ever hearing the due process argument. The judge tried to justify his arbitrary
action by stating in the order that he would hear objections to it if raised within 30 days
but at the same time he declared that he was already convinced that no due process
violations existed.
When the mater came before the Department of Commerce for agency review, that
department found that petitioners waived their right to due process by not opting for a
hearing under the Administrative Law Judge knowing full well that the he had already
ruled with prejudice on the due process issue.
The Division's most recent attempt to frustrate the Ferrieras' right to due process
is the Division's motion to silence this judicial review on false logic and sections of the
code cited out of context.
Petitioners complaint against the Division's abuse of due process is fueled by the
Divisions lack of knowledge about real estate transactions relative to the Land Sales
Practices Act. The Division does not understand that the act is designed to regulate
promotional subdivisions exclusively. The Division is not qualified to recognize
promotional subdivisions. Division does not understand that their duty under the act is to
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enforce full disclosure not to regulate the development of the subdivisions. The division
does not know that the purpose of the exemptions is to lessen the financial burden of
administration. Division does not realize the difference between land sales contracts and
transfer by conveyance of title. The Division does not know the importance of the type of
sales documentation relative to recision rights. Division does not understand the positive
effect of clear title at time of sale versus blanket incumbrances. The Division does not
understand its limitations in interpreting the law as opposed to their authority in the use of
implied expertise.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Specific Relief
Respondent respectfully requests this court to reverse the Division of Real Estate's
cease and desist orders and require them to do the following:
1) Issue a letter of exemption to Respondents;
2) Retract their cease and desist orders;
3) Return Respondents Registration documents;
4) Return Respondents Registration fee;
5) Pay monthly interest on all of Respondents real property and water rights in
Beaver County Utah from September 28, 1996 until the properties are sold or until
September 28, 2016 whichever occurs sooner.
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The property will be deemed sold for the above purpose whenever all of the
following are completed to respondents satisfaction:
a) The culinary water right is changed from .73 acre ft. per lot to .45 acre ft. per
dwelling for all of Respondent's land in Beaver because this is what it should have been in
the first place and respondent thinks the discrepancy must be what caused the present
conflict.
b) The Zoning of Respondent's land needs to be changed back to A-5. Beaver
County destroyed the A-5 zoning with a new General Plan.
In Lieu of Costs
Petitioners are not lawyers and they do not have the $15,000 plus required by most
lawyers as retainer for this case. Petitioners had to abandon all their ordinary efforts to
produce income in order that they themselves could take on the task of preserving the past
and future income from the sales of land in Mineral Mountain Ranchos. Therefore, they
request restitution for their lost time in the sum of $150,000.
Punitive Damages
Petitioners complain that the Utah Division of Real Estate is not presently qualified
to administer the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. Throughout this year and a half
of forced litigation, Petitioners have tried to reason with the Division on the matters of
due process and administration with not one sign of possible success.
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Therefore, Petitioners respectfully request punitive damages against the Division of
Real Estate in the amount of $300,000 or whatever other sum this court feels will impress
the Division of their need for self study on the origin, history, and ramifications of the
Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act and their administrative duties relative thereto. In
the years to come, the state will save much more than the punitive amount mentioned, if
the Division is precluded from improper litigation against innocent owners of non
promotional subdivisions.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Joint Petition
for Writ of Review by depositing the same in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the
)L

day of March, 1998 addressed to the following:
Blaine R Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Rights Division
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872
Dated this / A

day of March, 1998.

By:
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UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS'
MODEL LAND SALES PRACTICES ACT
Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted
Jurisdiction

Laws

Effective Date

Hawaii
Idaho
Kansas
Minnesota
Montana
South Carolina . . .

1968, c. 179
1969, P.A. 697
1967, c.
67-229
1967, c. 223
1972, c. 276
1967, c. 311
1973, c. 413
1969, c. 97
1968, c. 3052

Utah

1973, c. 158

Alaska
Connecticut
Florida

1-1-1970
8-1-1967

7-1-1967
7-1-1973

8-1-1973

Statutory Citation
• AS 34.55.004 to 34.55.046.
C.G.S.A. §§ 20-329a to 20-329m.
West's F.S.A. §§ 498.001 to
498.063.
HRS§§ 484-1 to 484-22.
I.C. §§ 55-1801 to 55-1823.
K.S.A. 58-3301 to 58-3323.
j M.S.A. §§ 83.20 to 83.42.
MCA 76-4-1201 to 76-4-1251.
Code 1976, §§ 27-29-10 to
27-29-210.
U.C.A.1953, 57-11-1 to 57-11-21.

Historical Note
The Uniform Land Sales Practices Act terstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act", 15
was approved by the National Conference U.S.C.A. §§ 1701 to 1720. The exemptions
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, provisions of the federal act, specifying the
and the American Bar Association, in 1966. situations when the federal act does not
It was changed to a Model Act in 1969. apply, may be found in 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702.
In 1968, federal legislation concerning interstate land sales was enacted as the "InPREFATORY NOTE
The promotional sale of land has been popularly designated as the
"Ten-Dollar-Down-Ten-Dollar-A-Month" lot sales plan. Land located in
Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, New Mexico, North Carolina, and
the Caribbean Islands, to mention a few, has been sold actively in this
manner. It is sold not only in the places where the land is located, but
extensively in the major metropolitan areas of the United States and
even in major cities elsewhere in the world.
In the past ten years there have been several national scandals
involving fraudulent promotions, and although the majority of those
involved in this billion dollar a year industry are operating honestly, the
scandals have been so dramatic that state legislative activity has increased substantially, and the United States Congress is presently
considering regulatory legislation.
At the present time approximately 50% of the states have legislation
dealing with the promotional sale of real estate. However, the existing
state laws on this subject vary greatly in the degree of regulation, and
there is a substantial lack of uniformity in the application of these laws.
Effective enforcement has been hampered by inability to apply the laws
beyond the boundaries of the individual states and by failure to include
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in the laws techniques available to affect transactions having contact
with several states.
The preparation of the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act began in
February of 1965. The drafting process included numerous drafting
conferences with representation from all areas of the United States, and
the Act, as adopted, reflects the comments, suggestions, and experiences of representatives of the land sales industry, related industries,
administrators, and the purchasing public. The drafters of the Act have
utilized effective portions of existing state laws.
The Uniform Land Sales Practices Act is designed to promote uniformity in the regulation of the land sales industry. Perhaps more
importantly, the Act is designed to place individual purchasers of large
scale promotional land offerings on an equal bargaining basis with the
promoter-seller. It achieves this purpose by providing for the examination of the promotional offering to determine (1) that it affords full and
fair disclosure to prospective buyers, (2) that the seller can convey
unencumbered legal title to the purchaser, and (3) that there are
sufficient safeguards to assure that the seller will complete the promised offsite improvements on the land.
The Act requires a subdivider satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of the Act to register his land prior to offering it for sale. This
registration requirement applies to land located within the state, and
also to land located outside of the state if sales activity takes place
within the state.
Those transactions which are not considered to fall within the regulatory scope of the Act are expressly excluded.
The application for registration of subdivided lands discloses pertinent
information that will allow the agency to determine if the subdivider can
convey the land offered for sale. Further, this information contained in
the application provides the basis from which the agency can determine
that there are reasonable assurances that the proposed improvements
promised by the promoter-seller will be completed as represented. The
Act contains a provision for the examination of the general promotional
plan to determine if it will afford full and fair disclosure to prospective
purchasers. If the subdivider has been involved in fraudulent promotions in the past, the land will not be registered, and, therefore, cannot
be sold to the public. After the agency is satisfied that the various
requirements are met, the land is then registered and may be offered
for sale to the public. As a safeguard against unfair administrative
delays, the law provides for automatic registration if the agency has
failed to act within 90 days after receiving the initial application.
The principal enforcement tools of the agency are the power to issue
cease and desist orders, to initiate and intervene in legal actions involving the subdivided lands for the purpose of protecting the rights of
subdivision purchasers, and to suspend or revoke the registration of the
land, thereby prohibiting further sale.
The Act contains criminal provisions and provides for interstate rendition of those persons accused of violating the law. Important to the
various states that will consider the enactment of this law, are the
provisions for reciprocity between the states and for interstate investigative cooperation.
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The public offering statement required by the Uniform Act is designed to afford full and fair disclosure to the purchasing public, and the
law requires that the subdivider give each prospective purchaser a
public offering statement as approved by the agency prior to the
consummation of the transaction. A civil remedy is given to persons
who have been injured through the defalcations of subdividers, in
addition to those remedies that are afforded at common law.
General Statutory Notes
Alaska. Adds section as follows:
"Sec. 34.55.006. Fraudulent and prohibited practices. It is unlawful for a person, in connection with the offer, sale or
purchase of subdivided land directly or indirectly, to knowingly

Georgia. Adopted an act called " Georgia
Land Sales Act of 1982" (O.C.G.A. §§ 443 - t to 44-3-19) which is not a substantial
adoption of the Model Act, but contains
some provisions similar to those in the Model Land Sales Practices Act.

"(1) employ a device, scheme or artifice
to defraud;
"(2) make an untrue statement of a material fact or omit a statement of a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or

Hawaii. The Hawaii act is a substantial
adoption of the major provisions of the
Model Act, but contains numerous variations, omissions and additional matter which
cannot be clearly indicated by statutory
notes.

"(3) engage in an act; practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a person/'
Connecticut The Connecticut act is a
substantial adoption of the major provisions
of the Model Act, but contains numerous
variations, omissions and additional matter
which cannot be clearly indicated by statutory notes.
Florida. L.1979, c. 347, renumbered,
amended, readopted or repealed the provisions of the Model Land Sales Practices
Act, effective July 1, 1979. The new act so
reconstituted appears as West's F.S.A.
§§ 498.001 to 498.063.
The Florida Land Sales Practices Act was
generally amended by L.1981. c. 177.
The Florida Land Sales Practices Act was
amended by L.1982, c. 400. Note that
L.1982, c. 400, § 3 provides that each section within chapter 498, Florida Statutes,
which is added or amended by that act, is
repealed on October 1, 1988. and shall be
reviewed by the Legislature pursuant to s.
11.61, Florida Statutes.
The newly constituted act remains a substantial adoption of the major provisions of
the Model Act, but contains numerous variations, omissions and additional matter
which cannot be clearly indicated by statutory notes.

Idaho. The Idaho act, which is entitled
"Sale or Disposition of Land Located Outside the State", is a substantial adoption of
the major provisions of the Model Act, but
contains numerous variations, omissions,
and additional matter which cannot be clearly indicated by statutory notes.
Kansas. Adds section as follows:
"58.3320. Registration and report fees.
"(a) For the registration of subdivided
lands there shall be paid to the commissioner a registration fee of ten dollars ($10),
plus one-tenth of one percent of the maximum aggregate offering price of the registered subdivided lands to be offered in
this state up to one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), plus one-twentieth of one
percent of the amount in excess of one
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) and not
exceeding four hundred thousand dollars
($400,000), plus one-fortieth of one percent
of the amount in excess of four hundred
thousand dollars ($400,000); but in no case
shall such fee be greater than five hundred
dollars ($500) for each registration: Provided, however, That the commissioner may
prescribe a maximum amount of subdivided
lands to be registered at any one time. If
registration is denied or withdrawn prior to
the offering of subdivided lands in this
state, the commissioner shall refund all of
the fee in excess of one hundred dollars
($100).
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"(b) The land and books and records of
every person selling or offering for sale
subdivided lands subject to the provisions of
this act shall be subject to examination by
the commissioner, or such other person as
the commissioner may designate, and the
examinee shall pay a fee for each examiner
employed to make such examination of not
to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25) for each
day or fraction thereof, plus the actual expenses, including the cost of transportation
of said examiner, while he or she is absent
from his or her office tot the purpose of
making said examination.
'The commissioner may require any registrant under this act to file a semiannual
report containing such reasonable information as. he or she may believe necessary
regarding the financial condition of such
registrant and the subdivided lands sold in
this state by such person. Each report
shall be accompanied by a filing fee of five
dollars ($5)."
Minnesota. The Minnesota act is a substantial adoption of the major provisions of
the Model Act, but contains numerous variations, omissions and additional matteT
which cannot be clearly indicated by statutory notes.
Montana. The Montana act is a substantial adoption of the major provisions of the
Model Act, but it contains numerous variations, omissions, and additional matter
which cannot be clearly indicated by statutory notes. It should be noted that the
Montana provisions corresponding to the
Model Act (MCA 76^-1201 to 76-4-1251)
relate only to instate sales of out-of-state
subdivisions. Montana has a separate set
of provisions (MCA 76-4-1101 to 76-4-1117)
which relate to out-of-state sales of in-state
subdivisions, but which do not correspond
to the Model Act
New Jersey. The New Jersey Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act (NJ.S.A. 45:15-16.3 to
45:15-16.26) is not a substantial adoption of
the Model Act although it contains some
similar provisions and has the same general
purpose.
South Carolina. Adds section as follows:
"§ 27-29-200. Fees; land, books and
records subject to examination by Commissioner; annual renewal reports.

rlC/i.

"(a) For the registration of subdivided
lands there shall be paid to the Commissioner a registration fee of ten dollars, plus one
tenth of one percent of the maximum
aggregate offering price of the registered
subdivided lands to be offered in this State
up to one hundred thousand dollars, plus
one twentieth of one percent of the amount
in excess of one hundred thousand dollars
and not exceeding four hundred thousand
dollars, plus one fortieth of one percent of
the amount in excess of four hundred thousand dollars; but in no case shall such fee
be greater than five hundred dollars for
each registration. Provided, however, that
the Commissioner may prescribe a maximum amount of subdivided lands to be registered at any one time. If registration is
denied or withdrawn prior to the offering of
subdivided lands in this State, the Commissioner shall refund all of the fee in excess
of one hundred dollars.
"(b) The land and books and records of
every person selling or offering for sale
subdivided lands subject to the provisions of
this chapter shall be subject to examination
by the Commissioner, or such other person
as he may designate, and the examinee
shall pay a fee for each examiner employed
to make such examination of not to exceed
twenty-five dollars for each day or fraction
thereof, plus the actual expenses, including
the cost of transportation of the examiner,
while he is absent from his office for the
purpose of making the examination.
"(c) The Commissioner may require any
registrant under this chapter to file an annual renewal report containing such reasonable information as he may believe necessary regarding the financial condition of
such registrant and the subdivided lands
sold in this State by such person. Each
renewal report shall be accompanied by a
renewal filing fee of one hundred dollars.
"(d) In order to carry out the provisions
of this chapter the Commissioner shall retain such fees and other funds which may
come into his possession to defray expenses
in the administration of this chapter/'
Utah. The Utah Act, known as the Utah
Uniform Land and Timeshare Sales Practices Act, is a substantial adoption of the
major provisions of the Model Act, but contains numerous variations, omissions and
additional matter which cannot be clearly
indicated by statutory notes.
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Section

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Definitions.
Administrative Agency.
Exemptions.
Prohibitions on Dispositions of Interests in Subdivisions.
Application for Registration.
Public Offering Statement.
Inquiry and Examination.
Notice of Filing and Registration.
Annual Report.
General Powers and Duties.
Investigations and Proceedings.
Cease and Desist Orders.
Revocation.
Judicial Review.
Penalties.
Civil Remedy.
Jurisdiction.
Interstate Rendition.
Service of Process.
Uniformity of Interpretation.
Short Title.
Severability.
Repeal.
Effective Date.

§ 1.

[Definitions]

When used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "disposition" includes sale, lease, assignment, award by lottery,
or any other transaction concerning a subdivision, if undertaken for
gain or profit;
COMMENT
Experience has shown the specific
terms, sale, lease, assignment, etc., are
not broad enough to cover many of the
transactions used by land promoters,

The term "disposition" is the broadest
possible term and is intended to inelude transactions in which no incidents of legal title are transferred.

(2) "offer" includes every inducement, solicitation, or attempt to
encourage a person to acquire an interest in land, if undertaken for
gain or profit;
COMMENT
Modeled after section 401(h), Uniform Securities Act.
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(3) ''person'' means an individual, corporation, government, or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, unincorporated association, two or more of any of the foregoing
having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or commercial
entity;
COMMENT
Modeled after the Uniform Statutory Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Construction Act, section 26, and the Act.
(4) "purchaser" means a person who acquires or attempts to acquire
or succeeds to an interest in land;
COMMENT

"Purchaser" is defined in this man- by gift, inheritance, or otherwise, in
ner to include persons who are not order to eliminate the necessity of privsuccessful in their attempts to acquire ity with the subdivider as a prerequiland because of invalid title or other s i t e t 0 a s s e r ting rights granted under
reasons, and also to include those per- t ^ ^ t
sons who succeed to an interest in land
(5) "subdivider" means any owner of subdivided land who offers it
for disposition or the principal agent of an inactive owner;
COMMENT

Modeled after section 337, Article may be desirable in defining "subdivi9-A, New York Real Property Law. der" in subsection (5). Such language
This definition does not include a trust should be directed to excluding from
company that holds bare legal title in that definition a trustee holding bare
trust for the use and benefit of anoth- i e g a i title t o subdivided land, and to
er or other inactive owner if sales are including within that definition the
made through a promoter
beneficial owner under the trust.
In those states in which subdividlt i s n o t
ed" lands are commonly sold by use of
believed that any additional
a subdivision trust, under which bare language is needed where a bank or
legal title to the land is held by a other corporation or individual holds
corporate trustee, additional language the bare legal title in trust
(6) "subdivision" and "subdivided lands" mean any land which is
divided or is proposed to be divided for the purpose of disposition into
[25] or more lots, parcels, units, or interests and also includes any land
whether contiguous or not if [25] or more lots, parcels, units, or
interests are offered as a part of a common promotional plan of
advertising and sale.
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Note 2
COMMENT
Copied in part from section 11.000
California Real Estate Law, and in
part from section 478.021(5) Florida
Statutes. It should be noted that this
definition does not require the land to
be presently subdivided, nor does it
require the land to be contiguous. A
subdivider who offers land located in
several different areas or states will be
subject to this Act if the land is disposed of pursuant to a common promotional plan. Although each case must
be examined independently, normally a
common promotional plan is one which
utilizes common advertising and sales
methods to the extent that the offering
begins to take on the character of a
fungible.
Even though the number 25 is bracketed, it is recommended that this Act

apply only to subdivisions of 25 or
more lots, parcels or units. The typical promotional subdivision, to be financially successful, normally has a
minimum of 25 parcels. It would be
unduly costly and burdensome to require smaller subdividers to comply
with the registration procedure set out
in this Act, and could overburden the
agency with an unnecessary amount of
administrative work. Further, the
subdivisions of 25 or fewer lots are
usually offered within a local area,
thereby giving prospective purchasers
an adequate opportunity to examine
the land and to be familiar with the
character and reputation of the subdivider.

Action in Adopting: Jurisdictions
the land shall be presumed, without regard
to the number of lots covered by each individual offering, as being offered for disposition as part of a common promotional
plan;".

Variations from Official Text:
Alaska. Subd. (6) reads: " 'subdivision7
and 'subdivided land' mean land which is
divided or is proposed to be divided for the
purpose of disposition into two or more lots,
units or interests and also includes any land
whether contiguous or not if two or more
lots, parcels, units or interests are offered
as a part of a common promotional plan of
advertising and sale; if the land is contiguous or is known, designated or advertised
as a common unit or by a common name,

Kansas. In subd. (2), substitutes "any"
for "every".
In subd. (6), inserts the phrase "situated
within or without the state of Kansas" preceding "which is divided" and substitutes
"(50)" for "[25]" in both instances.

Library References
Trade Regulation <s=*861.
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition § 237.
Notes of Decisions
Offer 2
Subdivided lands 1

Act. Wallis v. Thomas, Utah 1981, 632 P.2d
39.

1. Subdivided lands
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act clearly
indicates that land need not be presently
subdivided but only be proposed to be subdivided for purpose of disposition to constitute "subdivided lands" within meaning of

2. Offer
Postsale conduct designed to induce the
continuation of payments does not constitute an "offer" for purposes of the Uniform
Land Sales Practices Act State v. First
Nat. Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 1982, 660
P.2d 406.
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[Administrative Agency]

This Act shall be administered by [insert appropriate administrative
agency and any related provisions on selection and remuneration of
personnel, budget, annual reports, fees, and other administrative provisions which are appropriate to the particular state] which hereinafter is
called the agency.
COMMENT
Each state may place the administration of this Act under the agency it
deems most appropriate. Normally,
the state real estate commission is the
designated agency, but several states
with laws of this kind have taken other
approaches. For example, New York
places the responsibility on the Secretary of State, Ohio in the Securities
Commission, Florida in the Installment
JLand Sales Board, Michigan in the Corporation Securities Commission, Maine
in the Department of Banks and Banking, and New Mexico with the Attorney General.
Incorporated within this section.
should be provisions for financing the
agency. Whether the agency should
be financed from fees collected or
through a general appropriation or

some other method, should be determined by each state.
The cost of administering this lawwill vary in each state, and will depend
primarily on whether the state is classified as a situs state, an investor
state, or a combination of both. Florida, which has a separate regulatory
agency of regulating promotional land
sales, registers approximately 200 subdividers and approximately 3,000 salesmen. The agency employs 12 to 14
personnel including the executive director, attorneys, investigators and
clerical personnel. The agency has operated on an annual budget of $115,000 to $135,000. The annual budget of
the Florida agency is funded exclusively from fees collected.

Library References
Trade Regulation <s=*861.
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition § 237.
Notes of Decisions
Regulations which had been adopted to
1. Rules and regulations
implement
the Uniform Land Sales PracticNotice that the Department of Commerce
es
Act
prior
to the time it was amended to
proposed to adopt regulations in Title III of
apply
to
in-state
land sales as well as out-ofthe Administrative Code to implement the
state
land
sales
were required to be reproUniform Land Sales Practices Act with remulgated
after
the
adoption of amendments
spect to general provisions, filing proceto
the
Act
making
it applicable to in-state
dures, unfair acts and practices, advertising
land
sales;
failure
to
repromulgate the regand promotion plans, protection of purchasulations
did
not
deprive
developer of due
ers, and severability was adequate. State
process.
State
v.
First
Nat
Bank of Anv. First Nat Bank of Anchorage, Alaska
chorage,
Alaska
1982,
660
P.2d
406.
1982, 660 P.2d 406.
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§ 3.

[Exemptions]

(a) Unless the method of disposition is adopted for the purpose of
evasion of this Act, the provisions of this Act do not apply to offers or
dispositions of an interest in land:
(1) by a purchaser of subdivided lands for his own account in a
single or isolated transaction;
COMMENT
This subsection is modeled after section 402(b)(1) Uniform Securities Act,
and it is designed to make it unnecessary for an individual lot purchaser to

comply with this Act upon resale even
though the lands have been previously
registered.

(2) if fewer than [25] separate lots, parcels, units, or interests in
subdivided lands are offered by a person in a period of [12] months;
COMMENT
This exemption will exclude all locally oriented offerings and will allow the
seller to take advantage of the exemption even though the subdivision may
be large enough to qualify, by restricting the amount of land offered for

disposition. In order to qualify under
this exemption, the owner must not
only refrain from selling, but must
refrain from offering the requisite
number of lots for sale.

(3) on which there is a residential, commercial, or industrial building,
or as to which there is a legal obligation on the part of the seller to
construct such a building within [2] years from date of disposition;
(4) to persons who are engaged in the business of construction of
buildings for resale, or to persons who acquire an interest in subdivided lands for the purpose of engaging and do engage in the business of
construction of buildings for resale;
COMMENT
The exemptions of subsections (3)
and (4) are designed to limit the application of the Act to land upon which
the seller has no obligation to build

structural improvements and will eliminate those persons engaged exclusivei y j n the homebuilding business,

(5) pursuant to court order;
(6) by any government or government agency;
(7) as cemetery lots or interests.
(b) Unless the method of disposition is adopted for the purpose of
evasion of this Act, the orovisions of this Act do not apply to:
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(1) offers or dispositions of evidences of indebtedness secured by a
mortgage or deed of trust of real estate;
(2) offers or dispositions of securities or units of interest issued by a
real estate investment trust regulated under any state or federal
statute;
(3) a subdivision as to which the plan of disposition is to dispose to
10 or fewer persons;.
COMMENT
This exemption is designed to cover tots, but if it is offered for disposition
those persons who develop land for to ten or fewer persons, the transacwholesale distribution. The subdivi- tion is nevertheless exempt
sion may contain a large number of
(4) a subdivision as to which the agency has granted an exemption
as provided in section 10;
COMMENT
This subsection allows the agency to ty in order that the regulatory emphaexempt an offering which is locally sis remains principally on the promooriented and of a non-promotional na- tional offering,
ture. It is designed to afford flexibili(5) offers or dispositions of securities currently registered with the
[Commissioner of Securities] of this State; and
(6) offers or dispositions of any interest in oil, gas, or other minerals
or any royalty interest therein if the offers or dispositions of such
interests are regulated as securities by the United States or by the
[Commissioner of Securities] of this State.
COMMENT
The exemptions stated in subsections
(5) and (6) are designed to avoid duplication of regulation. If the promotion-

al offering is already registered as a
security and regulated by another
agency, the Act will not apply.

Action in Adopting Jurisdictions
Variations from Official Text:
Alaska. In subd. (a) introductory clause,
inserts "registration" preceding "provisions
of this Act".
Subd. (aX2) reads: "if fewer than 10 separate lots, parcels, units or interests in subdivided land located outside this state are
offered by a subdivider in a period of 12
months, or if fewer than 50 separate lots,

parcels, units or interests in subdivided land
located in this state are offered by a subdivider in a period of 12 months;".
In subd. (a), adds a paragraph (8) which
reads: "if the land is located in this state
and is registered or exempt from registration under the provisions of the federal
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act
(15 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)."
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Kansas. In subd. (a)(1), inserts "or her"
following "his".
T
LJ / vox
u *•*. * .«*•**. /cm" i?
In subd. (a)(2), substitutes fifty (50) for
"[25]".

Omits subd. (b)(5) and (6).
South Carolina.
.„
l
'*

Omits subd. (b)(5) and

Library References
Trade Regulation <s=>861.
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names
Unfair Competition § 237.

and

Notes of Decisions
Generally 1
Standard of care

tion was inapplicable in transaction between
subdivider and purchaser. Wallis v. Thomas, Utah 1981, 632 P.2d 39.

2

1. Generally
Section of Uniform Land Sales Practices
Act which provides that Act does not apply
to offers or dispositions of interest in land
by purchaser of subdivided lands for his
own account in a single or isolated transaction was designed to make it unnecessary
for individual lot purchasers to comply with
act upon resale even though lands had been
previously registered; thus, such subsec-

§ 4.

2

- Standard of care
In view of fact that the Land Sales Practices Act exempts from the Act's coverage
those subdividers offering fewer than 50
lots within the state during a 12-month period, it would be both illogical and unjust to
hold such small tract subdividers to a higher standard of care than that applicable to
their large-scale competitors. Stepanov v.
Gavrilovich, Alaska 1979, 594 P.2d 30.

[Prohibitions on Dispositions of Interests in Subdivisions]

Unless the subdivided lands or the transaction is exempt by section 3:
(1) no person may offer or dispose of any interest in subdivided
lands located in this State nor offer or dispose in this State of any
interest in subdivided lands located without this State prior to the time
the subdivided lands are registered in accordance with this Act;
COMMENT

Modeled after section 201(2) Uniform
Securities Act.
(2) no person may dispose of any interest in subdivided lands unless
a current public offering statement is delivered to the purchaser and
the purchaser is afforded a reasonable opportunity to examine the
public offering statement prior to the disposition.
COMMENT
Copied from section 337-b(4) Article chaser to be afforded a reasonable op9A, New York Real Property Law and portunity to examine the public offersection 11018.1 California Real Estate ing statement before consummation of
Law. This section requires the pur- the transaction.
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Action in Adopting Jurisdictions

Variations from Official TextAlaska. Subd. (1) reads: "no person may
offer or dispose of in this state an interest
in subdivided land before the time the subdivided land is registered in accordance with
this chapter."
Kansas. Subd. (1) reads: "No person
may in this state offer or dispose of any
interest in subdivided lands located within

or without this state prior to the time the
subdivided lands required under the act to
be
registered are duly registered in accordance w t h
t ™ act^ •
Subd. (1) reads: "No
S o u t h Carolina.
person may in this State offer or dispose of
any interest in subdivided lands prior to the
time the subdivided lands are registered in
accordance with this chapter/'

Library References
Trade Regulation <s=>861.
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names
Unfair Competition § 237.

and

Notes of Decisions
1. Generally
„_
.,,
£
Where none of three orange groves from
which sales of lots were made to Canadian
citizens was registered under Florida statutes applying to sale of interests in subdi-

§ 5.

vided land, lot sellers were liable to purchasers for such illegal sales, subject to any
a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e of limitations which could
s t a n ( j -m fc^ 0 f individual class member's
claim. Ferland v. Orange Groves of Florida, Inc., D.C.Fla.1974, 377 F.Supp. 690.

[Application for Registration]

(a) The application for registration of subdivided lands shall be filed as
prescribed by the agency's rules and shall contain the following documents and information:
(1) an irrevocable appointment of the agency to receive service of
any lawful process in any non-criminal proceeding arising under this
Act against the applicant or his personal representative;
COMMENT
Copied from section 414(g) Uniform rather than when the subdivider is opSecurities Act, except that the irrev- erating through an agent. (See section
ocable consent is given at all times 19, infra, for method of service.)
(2) a legal description of the subdivided lands offered for registration, together with a map showing the division proposed or made, the
dimensions of the lots, parcels, units, or interests and the relation of
the subdivided lands to existing streets, roads, and other off-site
improvements;
(3) the states or jurisdictions in which an application for registration
or similar document has been filed and any adverse order, judgment,
or decree entered in connection with the subdivided lands by the
regulatory authorities in each jurisdiction or by any court;
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(4) the applicant's name and address, and the form, date, and
jurisdiction of organization; and the address of each of its offices in
this State;
(5) the name, address, and principal occupation for the past five
years of every director and officer of the applicant or person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions; the extent and
nature of his interest in the applicant or the subdivided lands as of a
specified date within 30 days of the filing of the application;
(6) a statement, in a form acceptable to the agency, of the condition
of the title to the subdivided lands including encumbrances as of a
specified date within 30 days of the date of application by a title
opinion of a licensed attorney, not a salaried employee, officer, or
director of the applicant or owner, or by other evidence of title
acceptable to the agency;
(7) copies of the instruments which will be delivered to a purchaser
to evidence his interest in the subdivided lands and of the contracts
and other agreements which a purchaser will be required to agree to
or sign;
(8) copies of the instruments by which the interest in the subdivided
lands was acquired and a statement of any lien or encumbrance upon
the title and copies of the instruments creating the lien or encumbrance, if any, with data as to recording;
(9) if there is a lien or encumbrance affecting more than one lot,
parcel, unit, or interest a statement of the consequences for a purchaser of failure to discharge the lien or encumbrance and the steps, if any,
taken to protect the purchaser in case of this eventuality;
(10) copies of instruments creating easements, restrictions, or other
encumbrances, affecting the subdivided lands;
(11) a statement of the zoning and other governmental regulations
affecting the use of the subdivided lands and also of any existing tax
and existing or proposed special taxes or assessments which affect the
subdivided lands;
(12) a statement of the existing provisions for access, sewage disposal, water, and other public utilities in the subdivision; a statement
of the improvements to be installed; the schedule for their completion;
and a statement as to the provisions for improvement maintenance;
COMMENT
The information in this subsection of standard improvements such as acwill be helpful to the agency in deter- cess and utilities and whether or not a
mining whether the advertising and public agency has undertaken the rethe public offering statement give suf- sponsibility for maintaining the imficient information about the existence provements. Also, the section re681
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quires a schedule for completion, if the
promised improvements are not in existence. This schedule will enable the

agency to follow the progress of the
subdivider with respect to his obligations for completion of improvements.

(13) a narrative description of the promotional plan for the disposition of the subdivided lands together with copies of all advertising
material which has been prepared for public distribution by any means
of communication;
COMMENT
This information will enable the
agency to determine the areas in which
the subdivider will offer its property

and the manner in which the property
will be offered,

(14) the proposed public offering statement;
(15) any other information, including any current financial statement, which the agency by its rules requires for the protection of
purchasers.
COMMENT
Section 5(a) lists the principal information to be submitted to the agency
in order that it may determine whether
the subdivider can convey legal title,
has the resources to complete promlsed improvements, and whether the
advertising materikl relating to the
subdivision offers full and fair disclosure. This section principally consti-

tutes a compilation of various requirements required by the jurisdictions
presently regulating land promotions,
I f t h e enacting state currently regul a t e s s u b d i v i s i o n offerings, a grandfa,u
..
» ,» , 8 J * J •.
ther provision should be adopted to
av0ld
interrupting the operation of a
SomS business.

(b) If the subdivider registers additional subdivided lands to be offered
for disposition, he may consolidate the subsequent registration with any
earlier registration offering subdivided lands for disposition under the
same promotional plan.
(c) The subdivider shall immediately report any material changes in
the information contained in an application for registration.
COMMENT
Section 478.161(l)(c) Florida Statutes; section 11012, California Real
Property Law.
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Action in Adopting Jurisdictions
Variations
Kansas.
relating to
stance and

from Official Text:
Makes minor language changes
gender without affecting subsubstitutes "commissioner" for

"agency", wherever appearing, except in
- (a)(1) where "Kansas securities cornmissioner" is substituted for "agency",

subd

Library References
Trade Regulation e=>863.
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names
Unfair Competition § 237.

and

Notes of Decisions
1. Construction with other laws
~
..
^
Exemption from registration provisions
of the Federal Interstate Luid Sales Full
Disclosure Act provides exemption from

§ 6.

registration requirements of Uniform Land
Sales Practices Act, but does not immunize
sellers from l i a b i % under the U L g p A
fraucL
a ge,

S t a t e V- F]rst

f()p

N a L B a n k of A n c h o r .

Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 406.

[Public Offering Statement]

(a) A public offering statement shall disclose fully and accurately the
physical characteristics of the subdivided lands offered and shall make
known to prospective purchasers all unusual and material circumstances
or features affecting the subdivided lands. The proposed public offering
statement submitted to the agency shall be in a form prescribed by its
rules and shall include the following:
(1) the name and principal address of the subdivider;
(2) a general description of the subdivided lands stating the total
number of lots, parcels, units, or interests in the offering;
COMMENT
An integral part of many promotions
is an emphasis on the resale potential
of the lands offered for sale. This
section of the public offering statement is designed to show the buyer

whether the subdivider (the buyer's
chief competitor when he wishes to
resell) has an adequate supply of lots
t 0 m e e t f u t u r e demand,

(3) the significant terms of any encumbrances, easements, liens, and
restrictions, including zoning and other regulations affecting the subdivided lands and each unit or lot, and a statement of all existing taxes
and existing or proposed special taxes or assessments which affect the
subdivided lands;
(4) a statement of the use for which the property is offered;
(5) information concerning improvements, including streets, water
supply, levees, drainage control systems, irrigation systems, sewage
disposal facilities, and customary utilities, and the estimated cost, date
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of completion, and responsibility for construction and maintenance of
existing and proposed improvements which are referred to in connection with the offering or disposition of any interest in subdivided lands;
(6) additional information required by the agency to assure full and
fair disclosure to prospective purchasers.
COMMENT
Section 6(a) is copied from Section tained in the statement. New York
338.1, Article 9-A, New York Real has established a public offering proProperty Law and Chapter 188-6, spectus which is analogous to a securiRules and Regulations of Florida In- ties prospectus. Florida, on the other
stallment Land Sales Board. At the hand, has a property report which is
present time about one-half of the designed to furnish the prospective
states engaged in the _ regulation of purchaser with information which a
subdivision sales provide for some prudent and cautious buyer would norform of public report, prospectus, of- ma lly evaluate prior to purchase,
fering statement, or property report.
lt 1S f e l t
In this section this document is desig&** t}}e P*bllc offering
nated a public offering statement A statement should be thorough, but
great deal of attention has been fo- should be simple and concise. It
cused upon this matter and it has been should not contain such minutiae of
a subject of discussion at various con- detail as to lose the interest of the
ferences throughout the United States, reader, but should be sufficiently deWhile the purpose of the public report tailed and simple to reasonably assure
has been generally agreed to be the that the prospective purchaser will unproviding of pertinent and material in- derstand the material aspects of the
formation concerning the subdivision offering and the conditions of the propto the prospective purchaser, there ex- erty at the time the offering is made,
ists a wide variance of opinion as to and information concerning improvethe information that should be con- ments to the subdivision.
(b) The public offering statement shall not be used for any promotional purposes before registration of the subdivided lands and afterwards
only if it is used in its entirety. No person may advertise or represent
that the agency approves or recommends the subdivided lands or disposition thereof. No portion of the public offering statement may be
underscored, italicized, or printed in larger or heavier or different color
type than the remainder of the statement unless the agency requires it.
(c) The agency may require the subdivider to alter or amend the
proposed public offering statement in order to assure full and fair
disclosure to prospective purchasers, and no change in the substance of
the promotional plan or plan of disposition or development of the
subdivision may be made after registration without notifying the agency
and without making appropriate amendment of the public offering statement. A public offering statement is not current unless all amendments
are incorporated.
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Note 2

COMMENT
The public offering statement required by this section is originally prepared by the subdivider and edited by
the agency. This differs from the public report now used by some states
which is prepared initially by the ad-

ministrative agency. The requirement
for amending the public offering statement is copied from Section 337-b(7),
Article 9-A, New York Real Property
Law.

Action in Adopting: Jurisdictions
Variations from Official Text:
Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner'' for
"agency", wherever appearing.
Library References
Trade Regulation <s=>863.
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition § 237.
Notes of Decisions
Change in offering 2
Construction with other laws
Instructions 3
1. Construction with other laws
Purchasers' action under statute making
it "* * * unlawful for any person to make
or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the general public of the
state, or any portion thereof, any misleading advertisement * * *" was not preempted by Uniform Land Sales Practices Law.
Vance v. Indian Hammock Hunt & Riding
Club, Ltd., Fla.App.1981, 403 So.2d 1367.
2. Change in offering
Term "offering" as used in section of
Uniform Land Sales Practices Law providing that after order of registration has been
issued no material change of the offering
shall be made by subdivider without notification and written approval must refer to
something that was in existence before order of registration was issued and which it
is within power of subdivider to change,
alter, or modify but which legislature considered should not be changed, altered, or
modified without prior approval of Division
of Land Sales and Condominiums of the
Department of Business Regulation. Jaffe
v. State, Fla.App. 5 Distl983, 438 So.2d 72,
petition for review dismissed 436 So.2d 99.
Proposed advertising material, proposed
public offering statement, and proposed

contracts and other agreements which purchaser is required to execute under Uniform Land Sales Practices Law were included within the term "offering" as used in
section of statute providing that after order
of registration has been issued no material
change of the offering shall be made by
subdivider without notification and written
approval. Jaffe v. State, Fla.App. 5 Dist.
1983, 438 So.2d 72, petition for review dismissed 436 So.2d 99.
In prosecution under section of Uniform
Land Sales Practices Law providing that
after order of registration has been issued
no material change of the offering shall be
made by subdivider without notification and
written approval,, even if allegations of
charging document had accurately tracked
statute, proof at trial that defendant had
executed and delivered quitclaim, rather
than warranty, deeds as promised in agreement for deed would not have sustained
such allegations. Jaffe v. State, Fla.App. 5
Dist.1983, 438 So.2d 72, petition for review
dismissed 436 So.2d 99.
Term "offering" in section of Uniform
Land Sales Practices Law providing that
after order of registration has been issued
no material change of the offering shall be
made by subdivider without notification and
written approval does not mean or include
order of registration, and thus counts
charging unlawful land sales practices
based on material alteration, change, or
modification of order of registration were
defective in failing to allege material
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Note 2

change, alteration, or modification of "the
offering;' Jaffe v. State, Fla.App. 5 Dist.
1983, 438 So.2d 72, petition for review dismissed 436 So.2d 99.
3. Instructions
Even if term "offering" in section of Uniform Land Sales Practices Law providing
that after order of registration has been
issued no material change of the offering
shall be made by subdivider without notification and written approval included order
of registration, it was reversible error for
trial court to instruct jury that issuance of

§ 7.

quitclaim deeds to contract purchasers in
lieu of warranty deeds as provided in agreements for deed was, as a matter of law,
material change, alteration, or modification
of order of registration; whether any alleged change, alteration, or modification of
offering was material in given instance depended on substance of change, alteration,
or modification and subject matter and context and, as in fraud and similar cases, was
question of fact for jury. Jaffe v. State,
Fla.App. 5 Dist.1983, 438 So.2d 72, petition
for review dismissed 436 So.2d 99.

[Inquiry and Examination]

Upon receipt of an application for registration in proper form, the
agency shall forthwith initiate an examination to determine that:
(1) the subdivider can convey or cause to be conveyed the interest in
subdivided lands offered for disposition if the purchaser complies with
the terms of the offer, and when appropriate, that release clauses,
conveyances in trust, or other safeguards have been provided;
(2) there is reasonable assurance that all proposed improvements
will be completed as represented;
(3) the advertising material and the general promotional plan are not
false or misleading and comply with the standards prescribed by the
agency in its rules and afford full and fair disclosure;
(4) the subdivider has not, or if a corporation, its officers, directors,
and principals have not, been convicted of a crime involving land
dispositions or any aspect of the land sales business in this State, the
United States, or any other state or foreign country within the past
[10] years and has not been subject to any injunction or administrative
order entered within the past [10] years restraining a false or misleading promotional plan involving land dispositions;
(5) the public offering statement requirements of this Act have been
satisfied.
COMMENT
States regulating the land sales in- in advance to determine that it is fair,
dustry generally fall into three catego- just and equitable before registration,
ries—(1) those which merely prosecute This Act combines to some degree each
subdividers for fraudulent statements, of the foregoing theories. There are
(2) those which require affirmative ac- criminal provisions for fraud and nontion in achieving full and fair disclo- compliance. Full and fair disclosure is
sure from subdividers in their advertis- achieved by requiring the public offering and promotional materials, and (3) ing statement and through the option
those which examine the offering itself of supervising advertising. This Act
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does not direct the agency to make a ability to convey title to the lands ofdetermination as to whether the offer- fered, and if he promises improveing is fair, just and equitable, on the m e n t s , that he is in a position to guartheory that this decision is better made a n t e e c o m p l e tion. The agencv must
by the well-informed purchaser rather a J s o d e t e r m i n e t h a t t h e s u b d i v - d e r > o r
than an administrator. The Act does, .»
,.
. . , ,
^
however, go further than full and fair *f a corporation, its principals, have not
disclosure since it requires proof and b e e n ^^olved in fraudulent promotions
assurances that the subdivider has the wrthin t h e l a s t ten years.
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions
Variations from Official Text:
In subd. (3), inserts ''or regulations" folKansas. Substitutes ''commissioner'' for
*
"agency", wherever appearing.
In subd. (4), omits "entered".
Library References
Trade Regulation <s=863.
C.J.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition § 237.
§ 8.

[Notice of Filing and Registration]

(a) Upon receipt of the application for registration in proper form, the
agency shall issue a notice of filing to the applicant. Within [90] days
from the date of the notice of filing, the agency shall enter an order
registering the subdivided lands or rejecting the registration. If no
order of rejection is entered within [90] days from the date of notice of
filing, the land shall be deemed registered unless the applicant has
consented in writing to a delay.
COMMENT
Modeled after Section 478.141(3)
Florida Statutes. This section prevents the administrative agency from
arbitrarily delaying the application for

registration. This section affords an
additional remedy to an applicant and
is not a substitute for existing common
law or statutory prerogative writs.

(b) If the agency affirmatively determines, upon inquiry and examination, that the requirements of section 7 have been met, it shall enter an
order registering the subdivided lands and shall designate the form of
the public offering statement.
(c) If the agency determines upon inquiry and examination that any of
the requirements of section 7 has not been met, it shall notify the
applicant that the application for registration must be corrected in the
particulars specified within [10] days. If the requirements are not met
within the time allowed the agency shall enter an order rejecting the
registration, which shall include the findings of fact upon which the
687
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order is based. The order rejecting the registration shall not become
effective for [20] days, during which time the applicant may petition for
reconsideration and is entitled to a hearing.
COMMENT
Modeled in part after Section 9(g) ceipt of a waiver of the ninety day
1961 Model State Administrative Pro- deadline required by Section 8(a). The
cedures Act. The preorder notice en- p o s t order petition for reconsideration
ables the applicant to amend the appli- i s designed to give the applicant furcation prior to the time an adverse t h e r o pr pr o r t u n i t yJ to p r e s e n t h i s pr o s i t i o n
order is rendered. If the appropriate . .,
, . . , ,.
.
corrective measures cannot be taken to * he admumtrative
agency
pnor
to
within the ten day period, the agency. **f*** J u d l c i a l r e v i e w o f t h e agency's
may grant an additional time upon re- order.
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions
Variations from Official Text:
Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner" for
"agency", wherever appearing, and makes
some minor language changes without affecting substance.

South Carolina, In subd. (c), substitutes
"fifteen" for "[10]" days.

Library References
Trade Regulation <3=»863.
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition § 237.

§ 9.

[Annual Report]

(a) Within [30] days after each annual anniversary date of an order
registering subdivided lands, the subdivider shall file a report in the form
prescribed by the rules of the agency. The report shall reflect any
material changes in information contained in the original application for
registration.
(b) The agency may permit the filing of annual reports within [30]
days after the anniversary date of the consolidated registration in lieu of
the anniversary date of the original registration.
COMMENT
See section 5(b). Many subdividers
will register additional subdivided
lands to be offered under the same
promotional plan during the course of
the year. Upon each subsequent filing
all of the information relating to the

subdivided lands should be made current Normally a consolidated registratdon would obviate the necessity of
an annual report until one year after
the order registering and consolidating
the additional subdivided lands.

688

§10

LAND SALES PRACTICES ACT
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions
Variations from Official TextKansas. In subd. (a), substitutes "commissioner" for "rules of the agency".

the report may, at the option of the commissioner, be consolidated with the required
annual renewal report.

In subd. (b), substitutes "The commissioner at his or her option" for "The agency".
South Carolina. In subd. (a), inserts "renewal" following "file a" and provides that

j n su bd. (b), inserts
ceding «may permit».

"at his option" pre-

Library References
Trade Regulation <s=*863.
C.J.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition § 237.

§ 10«

[General Powers and Duties]

(a) The agency shall prescribe reasonable rules which may be adopted,
amended, or repealed [in compliance with the administrative procedure
act] [after a public hearing with notice thereof published once in a
newspaper or newspapers with statewide circulation not less than 5 days
nor more than 15 days prior to the hearing and mailed to all subdividers
not less than 5 days nor more than 15 days prior to the public hearing].
The rules shall include but need not be limited to:
(1) provisions for advertising standards to assure full and fair
disclosure;
(2) provisions for escrow or trust agreements or other means reasonably to assure that all improvements referred to in the application
for registration and advertising will be completed and that purchasers
will receive the interest in land contracted for;
(3) provisions for operating procedures; and
(4) other rules necessary and proper to accomplish the purpose of
this Act.
COMMENT
Modeled after Section 478.041(5),
Florida Statutes.
(b) The agency by rule or order, after reasonable notice and hearing,
may require the filing of advertising material relating to subdivided
lands prior to its distribution.
COMMENT
This Act does not require the filing their distribution, but if the agency
of all advertising materials prior to finds such filing is desirable either for
689
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all subdividers or particular subdividers, it is specifically authorized to do

so by rule or order after notice and
hearing.

(c) If it appears that a person has engaged or is about to engage in an
act or practice constituting a violation of a provision of this Act or a rule
or order hereunder, the agency, with or without prior administrative
proceedings, may bring <an action in the [insert the name of the appropriate court] to enjoin the acts or practices and to enforce compliance with
this Act or any rule or order hereunder. Upon proper showing, injunctive relief or temporary restraining - orders shall be granted, and a
receiver or conservator may be appointed. The agency is not required to
post a bond in any court proceedings.
COMMENT
This section is modeled after section
408 of the Uniform Securities Act.
(d) The agency may intervene in a suit involving subdivided lands. In
any suit by or against a subdivider involving subdivided lands, the
subdivider promptly shall furnish the agency notice of the suit and copies
of all pleadings.
COMMENT
Modeled after section 478.132(7),
Florida Statutes.
(e) The agency may:
(1) accept registrations filed in other states or with the federal
government;
(2) contract with similar agencies in this State or other jurisdictions
to perform investigative functions;
(3) accept grants in aid from any source.
(f) The agency shall cooperate with similar agencies in other jurisdictions to establish uniform filing procedures and forms, uniform public
offering statements, advertising standards, rules, and common administrative practices.
COMMENT
These important subsections enable for the purpose of uniformity. Withthe agency to establish reciprocal out uniformity of regulation with reagreements with similar agencies in spect to matters such as advertising
other jurisdictions and within the state standards, subdividers promoting land
690
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Note 2
nation-wide might frequently be frustrated by inconsistent rules. Through
reciprocal agreements the agency will

also greatly facilitate its ability to enforce the Act and reduce the cost of
the administration and investigation.

(g) The agency may exempt a subdivision of [.
J or fewer lots,
parcels, units, or interests from the provisions of this Act if it determines
that the plan of promotion and disposition is primarily directed to
persons in the local community in which the subdivision is situated.
COMMENT
See section 3(b)(4). This section is which prospective purchasers are fadesigned to allow the agency to ex- miliar with the land and the nature of
clude from its jurisdiction those subdi- the offering.
visions which are local in nature and in
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions
Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner" for
"agency", wherever appearing.

Blanks to be filled in, subd. (g):
Alaska. See variation note, infra.

In subd. (a), substitutes "shall" for
"may" preceding "be adopted" and uses all
material contained in both sets of brackets.

Kansas. See variation note, infra.
South Carolina, "one hundred".
Variations from Official Text:
Alaska. In subd. (a), substitutes "shall
be" for "may be" and uses •'Administrative
Procedure Act (A.S. 44.62)".
Omits subd. (g).

Omits subd. (g).
South Carolina. In subd. (a), omits
"adopted, amended, or repealed" and inserts bracketed material relating to public
hearing and notice.

Library References
Trade Regulation <s=>863.
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition § 237.
Notes of Decisions
board's order. Florik v. Florida Land Sales
Bd., Fla.App.1967, 206 So.2d 41.

Appointment of monitors 2
Jurisdiction 1

1. Jurisdiction of court
District Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction of proceeding on petition for review of
Florida land sales board's order suspending
private land corporation as registrant under
board and appointing monitors to oversee
land corporation's operations where proceeding, in effect, sought equitable relief
available to stockholder in court of equity
on issue whether officers had acted illegally
in agreeing and pleading guilty, in effect, to

2. Appointment of monitors
Florida land sales board lacked authority
to appoint monitors to oversee operation of
land company and to expend sums ranging
up to $150,000 for their expenses and salaries to be taxed against corporation. Gulf
Am. Corp. v. Florida Land Sales Bd., App.,
206 So.2d 457 (1968).
Florida land sales board lacked authority
to select monitors to oversee operation of
private corporation for purpose of seeing
that it complied with boards orders. Florik
v. Florida Land Sales Bd., Fla.App.1967, 206
So.2d 41.
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§ 1 1 . [Investigations and Proceedings]
(a) The agency may:
(1) make necessary public or private investigations within or outside
of this State to determine whether any person has violated or is about
to violate this Act or any rule or order hereunder or to aid in the
enforcement of this Act or in the prescribing of rules and forms
hereunder;
(2) require or permit any person to file a statement in writing, under
oath or otherwise as the agency determines, as to all the facts and
circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated.
COMMENT
Copied from section 407, Uniform information concerning violations of
Securities Act, except that the agency the Act
is not expressly permitted to publish
(b) For the purpose of any investigation or proceeding under this Act,
the agency or any officer designated by rule may administer oaths or
affirmations, and upon its own motion or upon request of any party may
subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence, and require
the production of any matter which is relevant to the investigation,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts, or any other
matter reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of material evidence.
COMMENT
Copied in part from section 407(b), from Rule 26b, Federal Rules of Civil
Uniform Securities Act, and in part Procedure.
(c) Upon failure to obey a subpoena or to answer questions propounded by the investigating officer and upon reasonable notice to all persons
affected thereby, the agency may apply to [insert name of appropriate
court] for an order compelling compliance.
COMMENT
Modeled after Rule 37a and 37b,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
[ (d) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, all proceedings under
this Act shall be in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.]
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COMMENT
To be deleted if the agency already
tes established special rules of proce-

dure or if the state has no administrative procedures act.

Action in Adopting Jurisdictions
Variations from Official Text:
Alaska. In subd. (b), substitutes "the
department or an officer designated by the
department" for "the agency or any officer
designated by rule".
Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner" for
"agency", wherever appearing.
In subd. (a)(1), inserts "or regulation"
following "any rule" and "and regulations"
following "of rules".

In subd. (b), substitutes "the commission" Jo* "rule" and "his or her own" for "its
own",
~ .^
, , /JX
Omits subd. (d).
South Carolina. In subd. (b), substitutes
"shall" for "may" preceding "subpoena".
0 m i t s s u b d <d)

er

Library References
Trade Regulation <s=>863.
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition § 237.

§ 12.

[Cease and Desist Orders]

(a) If the agency determines after notice and hearing that a person
has:
(1) violated any provision of this Act;
(2) directly or through an agent or employee knowingly engaged in
any false, deceptive, or misleading advertising, promotional, or sales
methods to offer or dispose of an interest in subdivided lands;
(3) made any substantial change in the plan of disposition and
development of the subdivided lands subsequent to the order of
registration without obtaining prior written approval from the agency;
(4) disposed of any subdivided lands which have not been registered
with the agency; or
(5) violated any lawful order or rule of the agency;
it may issue an order requiring the person to cease and desist from the
unlawful practice and to take such affirmative action as in the judgment
of the agency will carry out the purposes of this Act.
COMMENT
Copied from section 478.161, Florida
Statutes.
(b) If the agency makes a finding of fact in writing that the public
interest will be irreparably harmed by delay in issuing an order, it may
7A U.LA.—23
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issue a temporary cease and desist order. Prior to issuing the temporary
cease and desist order, the agency whenever possible by telephone or
otherwise shall give notice of the proposal to issue a temporary cease
and desist order to the person. Every temporary cease and desist order
shall include in its terms a provision that upon request a hearing will be
held [promptly] [within
days] to determine whether or not it
becomes permanent.
COMMENT
Modeled upon proposed amended
draft of Rule 65b, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions
Variations from Official Text:
.
„
A1
T
Alaska. In subd. (b), inserts 10 days".
Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner" for
"agency" wherever appearing.

In subd. (b), substitutes "the commissioner may" for "it ma/', and inserts "prompty, ^ l a s t sent ence.
South Carolina. In subd. (b), inserts
"promptly".

Library References
Trade Regulation <s=»863.
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition § 237.

§ 13.

[Revocation]

(a) A registration may be revoked after notice and hearing upon a
written finding of fact that the subdivider has:
(1) failed to comply with the terms of a cease and desist order;
(2) been convicted in any court subsequent to the filing of the
application for registration of a crime involving fraud, deception, false
pretenses, misrepresentation, false advertising, or dishonest dealing in
real estate transactions;
(3) disposed of, concealed, or diverted any funds or assets of any
person so as to defeat the rights of subdivision purchasers;
(4) failed faithfully to perform any stipulation or agreement made
with the agency as an inducement to grant any registration, to
reinstate any registration, or to approve any promotional plan or public
offering statement; or
(5) made intentional misrepresentations or concealed material facts
in an application for registration. Findings of fact, if set forth in
statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit
statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings.
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(b) If the agency finds after notice and hearing that the subdivider has
been guilty of a violation for which revocation could be ordered, it may
issue a cease and desist order instead.
COMMENT
Modeled after section 478.161, Flor- merely ultimate findings but are suffiida Statutes, with the addition of the ciently explicit to afford an aggrieved
language relating to findings of fact to p a r ty relief upon judicial review,
insure that findings of fact are not
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions
Variations from Official Text:
Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner" for
"agency", wherever appearing.

In subd. (b), substitutes "the commissiony " for "it may",

e r ma

Library References
Trade Regulation <s=*863.
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition § 237.

§ 1 4 . [Judicial Review]
[ (a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available
within the agency and who is aggrieved by an order pertaining to
registration, a cease and desist order, an order of revocation, or any
other final decision of the agency is entitled to judicial review under this
Act. This section does not limit utilization or the scope of judicial review
available under other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo
provided by law. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency
action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency
decision would not provide an adequate remedy.
(b) Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a petition in the
[insert the name of appropriate court] within [30] days after [mailing
notice of] the final decision of the agency or, if a rehearing is requested,
within [30] days after the decision thereon. Copies of the petition shall
be served upon the agency and all parties of record.
(c) The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the
agency decision. The agency may grant, or the reviewing court may
order, a stay upon appropriate terms.
(d) Within [30] days after the service of the petition, or within further
time allowed by the court, the agency shall transmit to the reviewing
court the original or a certified copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. By stipulation of all parties to the review proceedings,
the record may be shortened. A party unreasonably refusing to stipulate to limit the record may be taxed by the court for the additional cost.
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The court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to
the record.
(e) If, before the date set for hearing, application is made to the court
for leave to present additional evidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material and that there
were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceeding before the
agency, the court may order that the additional evidence be taken before
the agency upon conditions determined by the court. The agency may
modify its findings and decision by reason of the additional evidence and
shall file that evidence and any modifications, new findings, or decisions
with the reviewing court.
(f) The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall
be confined to the record. In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure
before the agency, not shown in the record, proof thereon may be taken
in the court. The court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and
receive written briefs.
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency
as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may
affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further
proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) affected by other error of law;
(5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.]
[Proceedings for judicial review shall be in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.]
COMMENT
Copied from section 15, 1961 Model
State Administrative Procedure Act.
If the state has an administrative pro-

cedure act, the sentence in the last set
of brackets should be used in lieu of
subsections (a) through (g).

Action in Adopting Jurisdictions
Variations from Official Text:
.
Alaska. Omits this section.

Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner" for
"agency", wherever appearing, and omits
reference to Administrative Procedure Act.
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In subd. (g), introductory text, substitutes
"commissioner's findings"' for "administrative findings".

South Carolina. Omits reference to the
Administrative Procedure Act.

Library References
Trade Regulation <s=>863.
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition § 237.

§ 1 5 . [Penalties]
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this Act or of a rule
adopted under it or any person who" willfully, in an application for
registration, makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
state a material fact is guilty of a [misdemeanor] [felony] and may be
fined not less than [$1,000] [$5,000] or double the amount of gain from
the transaction, whichever is the larger but not more than [$50,000]; or
he may be imprisoned for not more than [6 months] [2 years]; or both.
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions
Variations from Official Text:
Alaska. Section reads:

misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine of
$1 000 o r d o u b l e t h e a m o u n t
>
of gain from the transaction, whichever is
l a r g e r b u t n o t m o r e than $50,000, or by
imprisonment for not more than six months,
o r b y both fine and imprisonment"
n o t l e s s tb3n

"(a) A person who wilfully violates § 6
[§ 34.55.006 of the Alaska Act; set forth in
General Statutory Notes of the Model Act]
or § 8 [§ 4 of the Model Act] of this chapter
is, upon conviction, punishable by a fine of
not more than $50,000, or by imprisonment
for not less than one year "nor more than
five years, or by both fine and imprisonment
"(b) Any violation of this chapter other
than as provided in (a) of this section or of a
regulation adopted under this chapter is a

Kansas. Designates violation as felony,
provides for $1,000 as the minimum fine
an
d for 3 years as the maximum imprisonment.
South Carolina. Designates a violation
as a misdemeanor, provides for $1,000 as
the minimum fine and for 3 years as the
maximum imprisonment

Library References
Trade Regulation <s=»863.
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition § 237.

§ 16- [Civil Remedy]
(a) Any person who disposes of subdivided lands in violation of section
4, or who in disposing of subdivided lands makes an untrue statement of
a material fact, or who in disposing of subdivided lands omits a material
fact required to be stated in a registration statement or public offering
statement or necessary to make the statements made not misleading, is
liable as provided in this section to the purchaser unless in the case of an
697
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untruth or omission it is proved that the purchaser knew of the untruth
or omission or that the person offering or disposing of subdivided lands
did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known of the untruth or omission, or that the purchaser did not rely on
the untruth or omission.
COMMENT
Modeled in part upon section 410(a), 2672, dated June 9, 1966 now pending
Uniform Securities Actr and section 10 before the U.S. Senate,
of the Committee Print Senate Bill
(b) In addition to any other remedies, the purchaser, under subsection
(a), of this section may recover the consideration paid for the lot, parcel,
unit, or interest in subdivided lands together with interest at the rate of
6% per year from the date of payment, property taxes paid, costs, and
reasonable attorneys' fees, less the amount of any income received from
the subdivided lands, upon tender of appropriate instruments of reconveyance. If the purchaser no longer owns the lot, parcel, unit, or
interest in subdivided lands, he may recover the amount that would be
recoverable upon a tender of a reconveyance, less the value of the land
when disposed of and less interest at the rate of 6% per year on that
amount from the date of disposition.
COMMENT
Modeled upon section 410(a), Uni- tional. In those states the provision
form Securities Act. In some states a for attorneys' fees should be deleted,
statutory attorney fee is unconstitu(c) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a subdivider liable
under subsection (a), every general partner, officer, or director of a
subdivider, every person occupying a similar status or performing a
similar function, every employee of the subdivider who materially aids in
the disposition, and every agent who materially aids in the disposition is
also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the
subdivider, unless the person otherwise liable sustains the burden of
proof that he did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known of the existence of the facts by reason of which the
liability is alleged to exist. There is a right to contribution as in cases of
contract among persons so liable.
COMMENT
Modeled upon section 10(a)(4), Senate Bill 2672, supra.
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(d) Every person whose occupation gives authority to a statement
which with his consent has been used in an application for registration or
public offering statement, if he is not otherwise associated with the
subdivision and development plan in a material way, is liable only for
false statements and omissions in his statement and only if he fails to
prove that he did not know and in the exercise of the reasonable care of
a man in his occupation could not have known of the existence of the
facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.
(e) A tender of reconveyance may be made at any time before the
entry of judgment.
COMMENT
Modeled upon section 410(c), Uniform Securities Act.
(f) A person may not recover under this section in actions commenced
more than 4 years after his first payment of money to the subdivider in
the contested transaction.
COMMENT
This limitation of action should be
placed with the state's general law relating to limitations.
(g) Any stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring subdivided lands to waive compliance with this Act or any rule or
order under it is void.
COMMENT
Modeled upon section 410(g), Uniform Securities Act
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions
Variations from Official Text:
Alaska. Subd. (a) reads: "(a) A person
who disposes of subdivided land in violation
of § 6 [§ 34.55.006 of the Alaska Act, set
forth in General Statutory Notes of the
Model Act] or § 8 [§ 4 of the Model Act] of
this chapter is liable as provided in this
section to the purchaser unless in the case
of an untruth or omission it is proved that
the purchaser knew of the untruth or omission or that the person offering or disposing

of subdivided land did not know and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have
known of the untruth or omission."
Kansas. In subd. (b), the percentage rate
at 15% in both instances.
Makes minor language changes relating
to gender without affecting substance.
In subd. (g), inserts "or regulation" following "rule".
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Library References
Trade Regulation <s=>864.
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names
Unfair Competition § 237.

and

Notes of Decisions
Attorney's fees 11
and who misrepresented those facts or
omitted to mention those facts was properly
Construction with other laws 1
ordered to provide restitution to those perJury trial 9
Knowledge of purchaser as. to untruth or sons who purchased their lots after effective date of amendments to the Uniform
omission 5
Misrepresentation or omission of material Land Sales Practices Act making it applicable to sales of instate land. State v. First
facts 4
- N a t Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 1982, 660
Parties 8
P.2d 406.
Reliance 6
Standard of care 3
Liability of a subdivider for damages inStatute of limitations 7
curred by a purchaser of his lots because of
Theory of case 10
the presence of permafrost depends on the
Transactions within act 2
failure of the subdivider to disclose permafrost conditions that are known or could
have been known through the exercise of
1. Construction with other laws
reasonable care, that is, the use of appropriExemption from registration provisions ate testing methods and review of available
of the Federal Interstate Land Sales Full geologic data. Stepanov v. Gavrilovich,
Disclosure Act provides exemption from Alaska 1979, 594 P.2d 30.
registration requirements of Uniform Land
Sales Practices Act, but does not immunize 5. Knowledge of purchaser as to untruth
sellers from liability under the UliSPA for
or omission
fraud. State v. First N a t Bank of AnchorDefense provided in statute governing
age, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 406.
civil remedies for violation of Uniform Land
Sales Practices Act requires actual knowl2. Transactions within act
Actions of seller of land in lulling buyers edge on part of purchaser as to untruth or
into sense of security after the sales took omission on part of vendor; thus, failure of
place were not "transactions concerning purchasers to investigate proffered real esland" for purposes of the Uniform Land tate and discover its actual condition was no
Sales Practices Act and liability for fraud defense to vendor's violation of statute in
could not be imposed on that basis; the conveying real estate to purchasers. Wallis
language "transactions" should be con- v. Thomas, Utah 1981, 632 P.2d 39.
strued under the doctrine of ejusdem generEven if vendor had defense that purchasis as limited to transactions involving the er must exercise reasonable care to detertransfer of an interest in land. State v. mine truthfulness of any material represenFirst N a t Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 1982, tation in order to avail themselves of sec660 P.2d 406.
tion of Uniform Land Sales Practices Act
governing civil remedies for violations,
3. Standard of care
where vendor disposed of property in violaIt would be illogical and unjust for the
tion of section of statute governing regisSupreme Court to devise a rule requiring
tration, public offerings, statement and resubdividers operating before the Land Sales ceipts required for offer of interest in subPractices Act became effective to be held to divided land, vendor was liable to purchasa more exacting standard of care than that er. Id.
imposed by the Act Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, Alaska 1979, 594 P.2d 30.
6. Reliance
4. Misrepresentation or omission of maReliance is an essential element of cause
terial facts
of action under Uniform Land Sales PracticSeller who knew, prior to developing sub- es Law for subdivider's untrue statement of
division, of facts relating to flood hazard
material facts made in disposing of the in-
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terest in subdivided lands or in registration
statement or public offering statement.
Vance v. Indian Hammock Hunt & Riding
Club, Ltd., Fla.App.1981, 403 So.2d 1367.
7. Statute of limitations
Where none of three orange groves from
which sales of lots were made to Canadian
citizens was registered under Florida statutes applying to sale of interests in subdivided land, lot sellers were liable to purchasers for such illegal sales, subject to anyapplicable statute of limitations which could
stand in bar of individual class member's
claim. Ferland v. Orange Groves of Florida, Inc., D.C.Fla.1974, 377 F.Supp. 690.
8. Parties
State must proceed under Uniform Land
Sales Practices Act in a representative capacity but certification as a class action is
not a prerequisite to an award of restitutory relief. State v. First Nat Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 406.
State has the authority to bring suit in
the public interest on the basis of commonlaw fraud to obtain restitution for defrauded land purchasers. State v. First Nat

§ 17.

Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d
406.
9. Jury trial
Where State sought only injunctive and
restitutory relief under the Uniform Land
Sales Practices Act, developer was not entitled to trial by jury. State v. First Nat
Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d
406.
10. Theory of case
Land seller's right to fair trial was jeopardized when trial court adopted a new theory of the case, common-law fraud, at the
conclusion of the evidence in the case,
which had been tried on the theory of violation of the Uniform Land Sales Practices
Act State v. First Nat Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 406.
11. Attorney's fees
Under section of Uniform Land Sales
Practices Act governing civil remedies for
violation of statute purchaser may recover
reasonable attorney fees not only for initial
action but also for attorney fees incurred
upon appeal. Wallis v. Thomas, Utah 1981,
632 P.2d 39.

[Jurisdiction]

Dispositions of subdivided lands are subject to this Act, and the [insert
name of appropriate courts] of this State have jurisdiction in claims or
causes of action arising under this Act, if:
(1) the subdivided lands offered for disposition are located in this
State; or
(2) the subdivideds principal office is located in this State; or
(3) any offer or disposition of subdivided lands is made in this State,
whether or not the offeror or offeree is then present in this State, if
the offer originates within this State or is directed by the offeror to a
person or place in this State and received by the person or at the place
to which it is directed.
COMMENT
Modeled upon section 414(a), (b) and
(c) of the Uniform Securities Act.
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Action in Adopting Jurisdictions
the offeror or offeree is then present in this
Variations from Official Text:
state,
if the offer originates in this state or
Alaska. Section reads: "A disposition of
is
directed
the offeror to a person or
subdivided land is subject to this chapter, place in thisbystate
received by the perand the superior court of this state has son or at the placeand
to
which
it is directed;
jurisdiction in claims or causes of action or
arising under this chapter if
"(3) the subdivided land is located in this
"(1) the subdivided s principal office is lostate."
cated in this state;
Kansas. Omits par. (1).
"(2) an offer or disposition of subdivided
South Carolina. Omits par. (1).
land is made in this state, whether or not
Library References
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition §§ 237, 238.

Consumer Protection <s=»36.
Courts <s=>4.
CJ.S. Courts §§ 6, 7, 37 et seq.

Notes of Decisions
Retroactive effect 1
Rules and regulations
1. Retroactive effect
Amendment to Uniform Land Sales Practices Act making it applicable to in state's
sales is not to be given retroactive application. State v. First Nat Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 406.

es Act prior to the time it was amended to
apply to in-state land sales as well as out-ofstate land sales were required to be repromulgated after the adoption of amendments
to the Act making it applicable to in-state
land sales; failure to repromulgate the regulations did not deprive developer of due
process. State v. First Nat Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 406.

2. Rules and regulations
Regulations which had been adopted to
implement the Uniform Land Sales Practic-

§ 18.

[Interstate Rendition]

In the proceedings for extradition of a person charged with a crime
under this Act, it need not be shown that the person whose surrender is
demanded has fled from justice or at the time of the commission of the
crime was in the demanding or other state.
Library References
Extradition «s>34.
CJ.S. Extradition § 13 et seq.

§ 19.

[Service of Process]

(a) In addition to the methods of service provided for in the [Rules of
Civil Practice] service may be made by delivering a copy of the process to
the office of the agency, but it is not effective unless the plaintiff (which
may be the agency in a proceeding instituted by it)
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(1) forthwith sends a copy of the process and of the pleading by
[certified] [registered] mail to the defendant or respondent at his last
known address, and
(2) the plaintiffs affidavit of compliance with this section is filed in
the case on or before the return day of the process, if any, or within
such further time as the court allows.
(b) If any person, including any nonresident of this State, engages in
conduct prohibited by this Act or any rule or order hereunder, and has
not filed a consent to service of process and personal jurisdiction over
him cannot otherwise be obtained in this State, that conduct authorizes
the agency to receive service of process in any noncriminal proceeding
against him or his successor which grows out of the conduct and which is
brought under this Act or any rule or order hereunder, with the same
force and validity as if served on him personally. Notice shall be given
as provided in subsection (a).
COMMENT
This section should be deleted if the to service of process. Modeled upon
general statutes of the state provide a section 414 of the Uniform Securities
method for service of process that Act and section 5(2) of the Uniform
would be applicable to this Act If not, Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
this section should be included m the x ^
chapter of the state statutes relating
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions
Variations from Official Text:
Alaska. In subd. (a)(1), inserts "certified
''
f
Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner" for
"agency", wherever appearing and makes
minor language changes relating to gender
without affecting substance.

In subd. (a)(1), inserts "certified, or registered".
In subd. (b), inserts "or regulation" following "any rule" in both instances,
South Carolina. In subd. (a)(1), inserts
"certified or registered".

Library References
Consumer Protection <s»36.
Process e=>49.
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CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and
Unfair Competition §§ 237, 238.
CJ.S. Process § 25 et seq.

[Uniformity of Interpretation]

This Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
Library References
Statutes <s=>226.
CJ.S. Statutes § 371 et seq.
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§ 2 1 . [Short Title]
This Act may be cited as the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act.
§ 2 2 . [Severability]
If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the Act which can be given effect without the
invalid provisions or application, and to this end the provisions of this Act
are severable.
Library References
Statutes «=»64(2).
C J.S. Statutes § 96 et seq.

§ 2 3 . [Repeal]
The following Acts and parts of Acts are repealed:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Library References
Statutes «=»152.
CJ.S. Statutes § 282.

§ 2 4 . [Effective Date]
This Act shall take effect [not less than 90 days after enactment].
Library References
Statutes «=»255.

CJ.S. Statutes §§ 405, 407.
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September 30, 1996
MINERAL MOUNTAIN RANCHOS
MARKET WISE INVESTORS INC
CRESS AND JUNE FERRIERA
615 NORTH LOWER SACRAMENTO RD
LODI CA 95242
Re:

Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceeding
Case Number RE96-09-05

To Whom It May Concern:
Attached is an Administrative Cease and Desist Order issued
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 57-11-13 (1993) prohibiting
you from selling subdivided land in this State until such time as
you register the land as required by the Utah Land Sales Practices
Act.
If you wish to contest this Cease and Desist Order, you have the
right to a hearing before an administrative law judge at which time
you will have the opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond
conduct a cross-examination and submit rebuttal evidence as to
whether you should be prohibited from selling subdivided land
within this State without registering the land.
The hearing will be conducted as a formal adjudicative proceeding.
The presiding officer at the hearing will be J. Steven Eklund,
Administrative Law Judge., Department of Commerce. If you have any
questions on hearing procedures, he may be contacted at*Box 146701*
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6701. His telephone number is (801)
530-6648.
If you wish to request a hearing, you must do so in writing within
ten days of your receipt of the Cease and Desist Order. Pending
the hearing, the Cease and Desist Order remains in effect. If, at
the hearing, a finding is made that there has been a violation, the
Cease and Desist Order will be made permanent.
If you fail to
cease the act or practice, the Director of the Division of Real
Estate may file suit against you in District Court to enjoin and
restrain you from the act or practice.
If you do not contest the Cease and Desist Order by requesting a
hearing, the Cease and Desist Order will remain in effect.

You may represent yourself or you are entitled to be represented by
legal counsel at all times while this action is pending. If you
will be represented by legal counsel, your counsel should file an
Entry of appearance with the Division no later than the date of
your request for a hearing.
Sincerely,
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE

Shelley K. Wismer
STAFF LEGAL COUNSEL
96-09-05.na

BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE DIVISION OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, BY
AND THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR,
TED BOYER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER TO CEASE

vs.

AND DESIST

MINERAL MOUNTAIN RANCHOS,
MARKET WISE INVESTORS, INC.,
CRESS FERRIERA, and JUNE FERRIERA,

CASE NO. RE96-09-05

Respondents.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Pursuant to investigation by the Utah Division of Real Estate
of the Department of Commerce of the State of Utah and upon receipt:
of information therefrom, the Director of the Utah Division of Real
Estate has reason to believe that the above-named Respondents have
been, and are, engaging in acts constituting violation of the Utah
Land Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 57-11-1, et
sea. (1993), to wit:

Selling lots in the Mineral Mountain Ranches

Subdivision in Beaver County, Utah which are not registered with
the Division of Real Estate under the provisions of the Utah Land
Sales Practices Act and which are not exempt from registration.
The Director concludes chat such acts constitute a threat tc
the public welfare.

It also appearing that it would be in the

public interest to stop such acts, the following Order is issued
pursuant to the provision of Utah Code Annotated Section 57-11-13
(1993) :

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named Respondents and any
officers, agents, servants, employees and those persons in active
concert or participation with Respondents who receive actual notice
of this Order by personal service or otherwise; now,
CEASE

AND

DESIST

from

the

acts

of

offering

or

selling

subdivided lands in this State until such time as such interests
are properly registered with the Division of Real Estate of the
Department of Commerce of the State of Utah under the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated Section 57-11-1, et sea.

The acts prohibited

include, but are not limited to, selling or offering for sale lots
in

the

Mineral

Mountain

acreage.

Ranchos

Subdivision

or

any

adjacent

/

Dated this CjU

day of

.TVJO^A

UTAH DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I
document upon Mineral Mountain
and Cress Ferriera by mailing
with postage prepaid, to Cress
Rd., Lodi, CA 95242.
Dated this

3D

have this day served the foregoing
Ranchos, Market Wise Investors, Inc.
a copy thereof, properly addressed,
Ferriera, 615 North Lower Sacramento

day of

1996

l/jlAf^MzUMHa^u^
Signature
96-09-05.cd

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of
Mineral Mountain Ranchos,
Market Wise Investors Inc.,
Cress Ferriera and June Ferriera

:

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Case No. RE96-09-05

Appearances:
Blaine R. Ferguson for the Division of Real Estate
Cress Ferriera for Respondents
By the Administrative Law Judge:
A February 24, 1997 hearing was conducted in the above-entitled proceeding before J.
Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Commerce. Thereafter,
evidence was offered and received.
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters his
Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and submits the following Recommended Order to the
Division for its review and action:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Respondent Cress Ferriera is the president of Market Wise Investors, Inc., a
California corporation. Respondent June Ferriera is the secretary of that corporation. The
Mineral Mountain Ranchos subdivision, consisting of 22 lots, is located in Beaver County,
Utah.
2. The Beaver County Planning Commission reviewed the preliminary plat of the
subdivision on April 20, 1983. The June 15, 1983 Beaver County Planning Commission
minutes reflect Mr. Ferriera met with the Board on that date to obtain approval of the
subdivision. Mr. Ferriera thus proposed to give .45 acre feet of water with each lot and
further proposed that any subsequent purchaser of a lot would sign an agreement to thus
acquire a total of .73 acre feet of water prior to building on the lot.

3. The Board recommended that Mr. Ferriera-as the subdivider-be required to
furnish .73 acre feet of water for each lot and the size of the subdivision be reduced if there
was insufficient water to supply that amount of water to each lot. The Planning Commission
minutes further reflect Mr. Ferriera elected to resubmit a plat with 20 five acre parcels for
subsequent review and approval by the Board.
4. The Beaver County Planning Commission reviewed the revised plat on July 6,
1983, which reflects 20 five acre parcels. The Commission accepted that plat as thus
presented. The Beaver County Commission approved the proposed subdivision on July 7,
1983. Existing Beaver County ordinances regulating the platting and recording of
subdivisions required that the subdivision plan reflect approval by the Planning Commission
of "the quantity and feasibility of providing culinary water to the subdivision".
5. Chapters 2 and 3 of the just-referenced ordinances establish the requirements
applicable to preliminary and final plats. Chapter 4-5(a) provides all subdivisions "shall have
a supply of culinary water available to each lot in the subdivision." Subsection (b) also
provides the quantity and method of distribution "shall be approved by the Commission."
Subsection (c) further provides all buyers in the subdivision "shall be advised of specific
points of connection or availability of water and the earliest time at which connection may be
made or at what time water may be made available".
6. Respondents had submitted an April 1983 feasibility study to Beaver County
regarding the Mineral Mountain Ranchos subdivision. The study recites that individual water
wells "are anticipated as sources of supply for each lot". The study also references a
statement from the Utah State Engineer "which discusses feasibility of obtaining ground
water". The study also recites Respondent Cress Ferriera "plans to deed 0.45 acre-foot to
each lot at the time they are purchased" as to "allow the drilling of a well with sufficient
water rights for domestic purposes".
7. The feasibility study includes a March 7, 1983 letter from Gerald W. Stoker, area
engineer for the State of Utah, Natural Resources and Energy Water Rights Division. The
letter reflects Respondent Cress Ferriera has drilled one \Vell on his property as to the
proposed subdivision, but the Division of Water Rights "has not made a determination on the
quality of the water developed". The letter further states it was anticipated "there would be
2

additional sites within the four section area mentioned that would have the potential for
potable water but that opinion is speculatory".
8. Respondent drilled a well on two lots in the subdivision during 1982 and 1983.
Respondent drilled two more wells on different lots in the subdivision during 1993. Based
on the substantial and credible evidence presented, the four existing wells have an aggregate
pumping capacity sufficient to provide water to all lots in the subdivision. However,
Respondents have not provided every lot with actual access to water available through
existing wells on adjoining lots.
9. The Division and Respondents agree and acknowledge that lots in the Mineral
Mountain Ranchos subdivision are not, and never have been, registered with the Division
pursuant to the Utah Land Sales Practices Act. On or about November 17, 1995, Market
Wise Investors Inc. conveyed—by warranty deed—three lots in the Mineral Mountain Ranchos
subdivision to Douglas W. Parker, John C. Fry and Dale A. Fry, and Steven J. Scandell,
respectively.
10. Based on the substantial and credible evidence presented, no prospective
purchaser of a lot in the subdivision would necessarily be able to share a well with an
adjoining lot owner. However, access to water in that manner would avoid the expenses of
drilling a separate well on each lot. The above-described warranty deeds recite that no
"warranty is expressed or implied as to water quality or quantity". The deeds further recite
that the owner of any lot agrees "that any use of water from the existing well is entirely at
their own risk".
11. The warranty deeds also provide Respondent Market Wise Investors, Inc. has
reserved "the right to install and maintain additional pumping facilities in the well for their
own exclusive use providing said pumping facilities do not curtail the availability of culinary
water to owners of the aforementioned lots". Moreover, the just-described easement is given
in lieu of "any and all obligations that might exist now or in the future" upon Respondents or
their successors and assigns "in regards to providing water to any of the aforementioned
lots".
12. The Division issued a September 30, 1996 Cease and Desist Order, whereby
Respondents Mineral Mountain Ranchos, Market Wise Investors, Inc., Cress Ferriera and
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June Ferriera were ordered to cease and desist from offering or selling lots in the Mineral
Mountain Ranchos subdivision, any adjacent acreage or any other subdivided lands in Utah
until such time as those lands are properly registered with the Division. The September 30,
1996 Order further recites the lots in question are not exempt from registration and that the
Order was entered because the sale of unregistered lots constitutes a threat to the public
welfare.
13. Respondent Cress Ferriera contacted this Court by telephone on October 11, 1996
and thus timely preserved Respondents' right to subsequently request a hearing to formally
contest the September 30, 1996 Order. Respondents submitted an application to register the
lands in question, which was received by the Division on October 28, 1996. The Division
has neither granted nor denied that application. Notwithstanding the submission of that
application, Respondents have notified the Division that Respondents believe the subdivision
is exempt from registration.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents assert the Mineral Mountain Ranchos subdivision is exempt from
registration under the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. Specifically, Respondents
contend §57-1 l-4(l)(f) of that Act creates an exemption from registration which is applicable
in this proceeding.
The Division asserts no statutory exemption applies as to obviate the need for
registration of the subdivision in question. Specifically, the Division urges Respondents have
failed to provide satisfactory assurance of completion of the improvements for culinary water
as to the lands under review. Accordingly, the Division contends none of those lands in
question may be sold without being duly registered under the Act.
U.C.A. §57-11-5 provides:
Unless the subdivided lands or the transaction is exempt under §57-11-4, the
following apply:
(1) No person may offer or dispose of any interest in subdivided lands
located in this state prior to the time the subdivided lands are registered in
accordance with this chapter . . . .
§57-11-4(1) provides the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act does not apply to offers or
dispositions of an interest in land:
4

(f) if at the time of the offer or disposition the subdivider
furnishes satisfactory assurance of completion of the improvements
described in Subsections (ii) and (iii) and the interest lies within the
boundaries of a first, second or third class city or county which:
(i) has a planning and zoning board utilizing or
employing at least one professional planner;
(ii) enacts ordinances which require approval of
planning, zoning, and plats, including the approval of plans
for streets, culinary water, sanitary sewer, and flood control;
and
(iii) in which the interest in land will have the
improvements described in Subsection (ii) plus telephone and
electricity . . .
The Division and Respondent have stipulated that the Mineral Mountain Ranchos subdivision
is located within the boundaries of Beaver County, that the county had a planning and zoning
board utilizing or employing at least one professional planner, that the county had enacted
ordinances requiring approval of planning, zoning and plats-which also included the approval
of plans for culinary water—and that no dispute exists in this proceeding with respect to any
improvements beyond those required as to culinary water.
The above-quoted statute was enacted in 1991 and necessarily governs as of the time an
offer or disposition is made by a subdivider with respect to the lands in question. Respondent
urges the prior version of §57-ll-4(l)(f), effective when Beaver County approved the
subdivision in 1983, is relevant and that statute-unlike the 1991 version-did not expressly
require the subdivider to provide satisfactory assurance of completion of the improvements in
question.
The prior version of §57-11-4(1) provided that registration requirements of the Utah
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act did not apply to offers or dispositions of an interest in land:
(f) Which at the time of the offer or disposition lies within the boundaries
of a first, second or third class city or a county, which city or county has a
planning and zoning board utilizing or employing at least one professional
planner, and which interest in land is subject to ordinances which require
approval of planning and zoning and plats, including the approval of plans
for streets, culinary water, sanitary sewer, and flood control, and which
requires satisfactory assurance of completion of all of those improvements,
and which interest in land will have all of those improvements plus telephone
and electricity . . . (All emphasis herein added).
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Concededly, the 1981 statute did not expressly impose a duty on the subdivider to provide
satisfactory assurance of completion of all necessary improvements. Nevertheless, that
statute clearly provides that the ordinances in question must require satisfactory assurance of
completion of improvements. By necessary and reasonable implication, such assurance
would be forthcoming from the subdivider.
Despite the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes there is no operative difference
between the above-quoted versions of §57-ll-4(l)(f). Specifically, the Court readily
concludes both statutes required initial approval of plans for culinary water and that the
subdivider would be required to provide satisfactory assurance of completion of those
improvements at the time of any subsequent offer or disposition of an interest in the land in
question. Clearly, the Beaver County Commission did not require Respondents to actually
provide direct access to water on every lot prior to the approval of the subdivision in 1983.
Moreover, the Commission merely required that a sufficient quantity of water be
subsequently available to each lot owner and the Commission was necessarily satisfied that
such a quantity existed when the subdivision was approved approximately fourteen years ago.
The critical issue is what constitutes "completion of the improvements" as to culinary
water with respect to the subdivision under review. The mere fact that Respondents could
convey some interest in water rights to a prospective lot purchaser or that any prospective
purchaser could enter an agreement with the owner of an adjacent lot to share a well and
thus realize actual access to culinary water on the land in question cannot be reasonably
construed to constitute the completion of improvements, as that phrase is used in §57-114(l)(f).
Respondents may well have satisfied the Beaver County Commission as to the potential
availability of water for the lands in question to thus prompt approval of the platted
subdivision. However, §57-ll-4(l)(f) requires a subsequent assurance by the subdivider of
the completion of improvements as to culinary water when an offer or disposition of the
interest in the land is made. Clearly, the improvements in question must necessarily consist
of either the construction of a well on each lot to actually provide culinary water for that lot
or the completion of a delivery system whereby water from an adjoining lot is available to
the lot in question. Since Respondents concede water is not actually available on each lot in
6

the subdivision at the present time, the Court finds and concludes Respondents have not
provided assurance of the completions of improvements as to culinary water to thus qualify
for an exemption from registration under §57-ll-4(l)(f).
The Division also urges Respondents must apply for an exemption under §57-11-4(3).
That statute provides as follows:
(a) Notwithstanding the exemptions in Subsections (1) and (2), any person
making an offer or disposition of an interest in land which is located in Utah
shall apply to the Division for an exemption before the offer or disposition is
made if:
(i) the person is representing, in connection with the offer or
disposition, the availability of culinary water service to or on the
subdivided land; and
(ii) the culinary water service is provided by a water corporation as
defined in §54-2-1.
Respondents have generally represented to prospective purchasers that water is available in
the subdivision. However, there is a lack of substantial and credible evidence that
Respondents have represented that culinary water service is available to each lot in the
subdivision. Significantly, no evidence was presented in this proceeding that any culinary
water service is provided by any water corporation as defined in §54-2-1. Thus, §57-114(3)(a)(ii) does not apply and Respondents are not statutorily bound to file any request with
the Division for an exemption under §57-11-4(3).
A procedural issue should also be addressed. During the February 24, 1997 hearing,
Respondents asserted the September 30, 1996 Order was invalid as having been prematurely
issued without the opportunity for a hearing or the submission of any information by
Respondents to the Division as to possibly resolve any concerns prior to the issuance of the
Order. The Court duly notes §57-11-13, which provides:
(l)(a) If the director has reason to believe that any person has been or is
engaging in conduct violating this chapter . . . he shall issue and serve upon the
person a cease and desist order and may also order the person to take such
affirmative actions as the director determines will carry out the purposes of this
chapter.
(b) The person served may request an adjudicative proceeding within ten
days after receiving the order.
(c) The cease and desist order remains in effect pending the hearing.
(d) The division shall follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63,
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Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, if the person served requests a
hearing.
Significantly, §57-11-13(2) further provides:
(a) After the hearing the director may issue an order making the cease and
desist order permanent if the director finds there has been a violation of this
chapter.
The just-quoted statute clearly authorizes the director to issue a cease and desist order
prior to conducting any hearing on the issues which prompt the issuance of that order. As a
corollary, the statute duly provides any person to whom a cease and desist order is directed
may request a hearing to challenge the validity of that order. Given Respondents' belief that
the lands in question are exempt from registration under the Act, they requested that a
hearing be conducted in this proceeding. The hearing was timely conducted and Respondents
were thus afforded all due process required by statute in that regard.
During the February 24, 1997 hearing, Respondents requested the opportunity to
subsequently challenge the validity of the September 30, 1996 Order on the basis that the
Order had been improperly issued without a prior hearing. The Court thus granted
Respondents leave to raise that issue following the issuance of any order as to whether the
lands under review are exempt from registration under the Act. This Court remains
convinced that the September 30, 1996 Order was issued in full compliance with the
procedural requirements mandated by §57-11-13. Nevertheless, the Court will address any
request filed by Respondents to challenge the validity of that Order if Respondents file a
written objection in that regard no later than thirty (30) days from the date the Recommended
Order set forth below may be adopted by the Division.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED the September 30, 1996 Order shall become
permanent, effective the date this Recommended Order is adopted by the Division.
Specifically, the Mineral Mountain Ranchos subdivision is not exempt from registration
under Utah law. Accordingly, no offer of an interest in those lands or any disposition of an
interest in those lands may be made until such time as the lands are duly registered with the
Division.
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I hereby certify the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommended Order were submitted to Ted Boyer, Director of the Division of Real Estate,
on the 3&*^ day of June, 1997 for his review and action.
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CERTIFICATE OF SSRVICE
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed the foregoing
Order and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended
Order to:
Cress Ferriera
615 N Lower Sacramento Rd.
Lodi, CA 95242
and hand-delivered a copy to:
Blaine R. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Rights Division
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
Dated this ^j

day of June, 1997.

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of
Mineral Mountain Ranchos,
Market Wise Investors Inc.,
Cress Ferriera and June Ferriera

ORDER
Case No. RE96-09-05

The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order are
hereby adopted.
Dated this

/
*-{

day of June, 1997.

Wf^

Ted Boyer, Director
Division of Real Estate

Agency review of this order may be obtained by filing a request for agency review
with the Executive Director, Department of Commerce within thirty (30) days after the date
of this order. The laws and rules governing agency review are found in §63-46b-12 of the
Utah Code and §R151~46b-12 of the Utah Administrative Code.

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF
MINERAL MOUNTAIN RANCHOS,
MARKET WISE INVESTORS, INC.,
CRESS FERRIERA and
JUNE FERRIERA

ORDER ON REVIEW
Case No. RE96-09-05

INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Executive Director on the request of the Petitioners,
Mineral Mountain Ranchos, Market Wise Investors, Inc., Cress Ferriera and June Ferriera
(hereafter collectively referred to as "Petitioner"), for agency review of the Order heretofore
entered by the Division of Real Estate (hereafter "Division").

STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Section 63-46b-12,
Utah Code Annotated, and Rule Rl 51-46b-12 of the Utah Administrative Code.

ISSUES REVIEWED
1.

Whether Mineral Mountain Ranchos is exempt from registration under the

Uniform Land Sales Practices Act (also referred to hereafter as "Act").

I

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On September 30, 1997 the Division issued an Order to Cease and Desist

requiring Petitioner to cease and desist from the offer and sale of subdivided land in the State of
Utah until properly registered with the Division pursuant to the Uniform Land Sales Practices
Act. This order was signed for by Petitioner on October 4, 1996.
2.

The Order to Cease and Desist was attached to a Notice of Formal Adjudicative

Proceeding informing Petitioner of the right to contest the cease and desist order and request a
hearing to be conducted as a formal adjudicative proceeding.
3.

Petitioner filed a timely request for agency review arguing that Mineral Mountain

Ranchos is exempt from the Act and that the Division's cease and desist procedure was violative
of due process.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
,1.

The cease and desist order which was entered against Petitioner in this matter on

September 30, 1996 was entered under the provisions of UTAH

CODE ANN.

§57-11-13 which

provides, inter alia:
(1) (a) If the director has reason to believe that any person has
been or is engaging in conduct violating this chapter, or has
violated any lawful order or rule of the division, he shall issue and
serve upon the person a cease and desist order and may also order
the person to take such affirmative actions the director determines
will carry out the purposes of this chapter.
(b) The person served may request an adjudicative proceeding
within ten days after receiving the order.
(c) The cease and desist order remains in effect pending the
hearing.
(d) The division shall follow the procedures and requirements
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, if the
person served requests a hearing.
2.

The cease and desist order prohibited Petitioner from " . . . offering or selling

subdivided lands in this State until such time as such interests are properly registered with the
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Division
3.

The Executive Director is of the opinion that Petitioner's arguments concerning

the legitimacy of the Order to Cease and Desist are actually non-issues since the order would be
of no force or effect if the subject property is exempt from registration under the Act by operation
of law or, in the alternative, the property is determined to be entitled to exemption or becomes
registered under the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act.
4.

The applicable law governing the disposition of any interests in subdivided

property in the State of Utah is the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act which provides in
CODE ANN.

UTAH

§57-11-5, in part:
Unless the subdivided lands or the transaction is exempt
under Section 57-11-4, all of the following apply:
(1) No person may offer or dispose of any interest in
subdivided lands located in this state nor offer or dispose in this
state of any interest in subdivided lands located outside of this state
prior to the time the subdivided lands are registered in accordance
with this chapter.

5.

The threshold issue in this case is whether the subject property falls within the

purview of the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. UTAH CODE ANN. §57-11-4(1) provides that:
[ujnless the method of disposition is adopted for the
purpose of evasion of this chapter or the federal act, this chapter
does not apply to offers or dispositions of an interest in land:
(f) if at the time of the offer or disposition the subdivider
furnishes satisfactory assurance of completion of the improvements
described in Subsections (ii) and (iii) and the interest lies within
the boundaries of a first, second, or third class city or a county
which:
(i) has a planning and zoning board utilizing or
employing at least one professional planner;
(ii) enacts ordinances that require approval of
planning, zoning, and plats, including the approval of plans for
streets, culinary water, sanitary sewer, and flood control; and
(iii) in which the interest in land will have the
improvements described in Subsection (ii) plus telephone and
electricity;

6.

Property which is not automatically exempt as being outside of the auspices of the

Uniform Land Sales Practices Act may seek exemption of a commercial subdivision under the
provisions of §57-11-4(3):
(a) Notwithstanding the exemptions in Subsections (1) and
(2), any person making an offer or disposition of an interest in land
which is located in Utah shall apply to the division for an
exemption before the offer or disposition is made if:
(i) the person is representing, in connection with the
offer or disposition, the availability of culinary water service to or
on the subdivided land; and
(ii) the culinary water service is provided by a water
corporation as defined in Section 54-2-1.
(b) A subdivider seeking to qualify under this exemption
shall file with the division an application for exemption together
with a filing fee of $50 and an application containing:
(i) information required by the division to show that
the offer or disposition is exempt under the provisions of this
section;
(ii) a statement as to what entity will be providing
culinary water service and the nature of that entity; and
(iii) a copy of the entity's certificate of convenience
and necessity issued by the Public Service Commission, or
evidence that the entity providing water service is exempt from the
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission.
7.

The first question is whether Mineral Mountain Ranchos falls outside of the

provisions of the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. If the Act does not apply to Petitioner then
the Division was in error in attempting to force Petitioner to seek registration, and the decision in
favor of the Division would have to be reversed and the order requiring registration would
have to be dismissed and held for naught. However, the Executive Director does not reach the
conclusion that Mineral Mountain Ranchos is entitled to exemption as being excluded from the
Act..
8.

The only real dispute in this matter between Petitioner and the Division revolves

around the issue of culinary water at Mineral Mountain Ranchos and the furnishing of the same
to the lots in the subdivision. The applicable exclusionary test set forth under the Act in

UTAH

CODE ANN. §57-11-4(1 )(f) is that if, at the time of offer or disposition of the subdivided land, the

city or county in which the subdivision is located requires approval of plans for culinary water
and the subdivider furnishes satisfactory assurance of completion of such culinary water
improvements then the subdivision is excluded from the Act.
9.

Petitioner argues that the 1981 version of the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act

rather than the current enactment should apply to Mineral Mountain Ranchos since it was
subdivided under the prior enactment of the law. The Executive Director has examined the
current law and finds no language indicating that existing subdivisions were intended to be
grandfathered under it and Petitioner offers no compelling argument to the point that the
legislature intended to exclude from the Act unsold lots in existing subdivisions.
10.

The subdivision ordinance in effect in Beaver County in 1983 when Mineral

Mountain Ranchos was approved required that the proposed subdivision plan show the
"[ajpproval of the planning commission approving the quantity and feasibility of providing
culinary water to the subdivision" [§2-l-3(g)j. The ordinance further provided in §4-1-5 that:
a. All subdivisions shall have a supply of culinary water
available to each lot in the subdivision
b. Quantity and method of distribution shall be approved
by the Commission.
c. All buyers in the subdivision shall be advised of specific
points of connection or availability of water and the earliest time at
which connection may be made or at what time water may be made
available.. . . (Emphasis added).
11.

The June 15 1983 minutes of the Beaver County Planning Commission reflect that

Petitioner met with them seeking approval of Mineral Mountain Ranchos and proposed giving
.45 acre feet of water with each lot. The commission rejected Petitioner's proposal and required
Petitioner " . . . to furnish the .73 acrea (sic) ft. of water. It was recemmended (sic) that if
[Petitioner] did not have the Water to supply the whole Subdivision he should cut the
Subdivision down in the amount of Parcels so he could furnish the water." (Emphasis added).
The planning commission voted to accept the subdivision ". . . with twenty, five acrea (sic)
parcels with .73 acrea (sic) feet of water with.each lot." (Emphasis added).
12.

The Mineral Mountain Ranchos plat shows that the plat was filed on July 8, 1983.
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The plat contains the approval of the planning commission dated July 6, 1983. The record offers
substantial evidence to support a finding that Petitioner obtained approval of the Mineral
Mountain Ranchos by the planning commission based upon representations that culinary water
would be provided by Petitioner at each lot in the subdivision although Petitioner would argue to
the contrary. The Court of Appeals in Albertsons v. Dept. Of Employment Sec, 854 P.2d 570
(Utah App. 1993) states the standard for resolving conflicting evidence on a record review:
We defer to the Board's assessment of conflicting evidence.
We are in no position to second guess the detailed findings of the
ALJ which were adopted by the Board. It is not our role to judge
the relative credibility of witnesses. "In undertaking such a review,
this court will not substitute its judgment as between two
reasonably conflicting views, even though we may have come to a
different conclusion had the case come before us for de novo
review." (Citation omitted). "It is the province of the Board, not
appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence,
it is for the Board to draw the inferences. (Emphasis added).
13.

The record reflects that on June 13, 1996 Petitioner filed for record with the

Beaver County Recorder an amendment to the subdivisions covenants and restrictions providing
that Petitioner ". . . assumes no responsibility for quantity and quality of well water." This would
be in direct contravention of the agreement made by Petitioner to obtain planning commission
approval of the subdivision in which culinary water was to be furnished to the lots, and would
further be violative of the county ordinance. Such an action belies Petitioner's stated reliance
upon having been approved under the Beaver County ordinances. If the intent of such ordinances
can so easily be vitiated by subdivides, such action establishes and reinforces the need for
registration under the Act and oversight by the Division of compliance for the protection of the
public.
14.

Petitioner is mistaken in a number of his assertions regarding agency review.

Agency review is a record review governed by the same standards and rules as those applicable
to judicial appellate review.

UTAH ADMIN

R151-46b-12(7) establishes the standards of agency

review as corresponding to those established by UTAH

6

CODE ANN.

§63-46b-16(4) which provide,

among other things, that "[t]he appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:..." after which follows a specific shopping list of reasons
why relief might be granted to the party appealing the adverse action. Among the grounds
potentially applicable in this case are: that the agency acted beyond its statutory jurisdiction; that
the agency erroneously interpreted or applied the law; that the decision is based upon findings not
supported by any substantial evidence in the whole record.
15.

Although the Executive Director is required by

UTAH CODE

ANN.§63-46b-

16(4)(g) to review the "whole record" and the facts both supporting and detracting from the
findings to determine whether the action of the Division is "supported by substantial evidence",
the burden and responsibility remains upon the party challenging the facts to marshal all of the
supporting facts in favor of the decision and show that despite such facts the decision is not
supported by substantial evidence. First Nat 7 Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P. 2d
1163 (Utah 1990). The failure to so marshal the evidence permits the appellate court to accept
the findings of fact made by the inferior tribunal as conclusive. Crapo v. Industrial Comm 'n et
al, 922 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1996).
16.

The onerous burden undertaken by an appellant seeking to dispute the facts as

found by the inferior tribunal is spelled out in Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Whse.,
Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994):
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings
lightly. We repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants
must bear when challenging factual findings. To successfully
appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play
the devil's advocate. "[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves]
from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position.
In order to properly discharge the [marshaling] duty. . . , the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the very findings the appellant resists." (citations
omitted). One appellants have established every pillar supporting
their adversary's position, they then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in
the evidence" and show why those pillars fail to support the trial
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court's findings, (citation omitted). They must show the trial
court's findings are 'so lacking in support as to be "against the
clear weight of the evidence," thus making them "clearly
erroneous." (citations omitted).
17.

Petitioner is likewise inadequately familiar with the law and rules governing

agency review in asserting

UTAH ADMIN.

R151-46b-5(3) for the proposition that case law is not

controlling authority over decisions made by the Executive Director. The statement made by the
rule is that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the case law discussing and interpreting such
rules ("thereunder") are not controlling. The reason for this is that agency review is controlled
by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act rather than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the
UCRP rules and interpretive case law are persuasive or advisory only.
18.

Petitioner is correct in stating that

UTAH CODE ANN.

§63-46b-16(4) sets out the

grounds upon which relief may be granted rather than being a standard of review. "[SJection 6446b-16(4) deals with judicial relief, not judicial review. It is clear from this language that this
section does not affect the degree of deference an appellate court grants to an agency's decision."
Morton Int'l Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm >?, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). The Morton case is
also perhaps the best case explaining the three standards of review:
a. Findings of fact made by an agency are entitled to the greatest deference and will not
be disturbed if supported by any substantial evidence;
b. An intermediate standard of review exists concerning the application of facts to the
legal rules governing a case by an agency and grants some deference to the agency's experience
and expertise in such determination with the test being that of reasonableness; and
c. A correction-of-error standard applies to an agency's interpretation of law or issues
characterized as concerning general law, and the appellate court grants no deference whatsoever
to the agency on such issues.
19.

Although Petitioner seeks to argue with the findings of fact made by the

Administrative Law Judge, Petitioner is not entitled to do so for failure to marshal the evidence.
However there does not appear to be any dispute as to the ultimate fact: that Petitioner has at no
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time been registered with the Division pursuant to the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. The
issue before the Executive Director is therefore narrowed to either the second or third standard of
review in which either intermediate deference or no deference is to be granted to the decision
rendered by the Division. The Executive Director is of the opinion that the determination in this
review rests solely upon interpretation of the applicable law since the law either applies or does
not apply to Petitioner and, if it applies, Petitioner is either exempt or not exempt from the
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act.
20.

Petitioner attempts to argue in his briefs that the term "culinary water" does not

equate to "potable water", a position which is not sustained by a search of Utah case law and
references to water found elsewhere in the Utah Code Annotated of 1953. In such sources four
types of water merit mention: culinary, domestic, irrigation and industrial. In the few instances
where "potable" appears it is used in conjunction with "culinary" as a synonym. Therefore the
Executive Director is of the opinion that "culinary water" as used in the applicable statutes and
the Beaver County Subdivision Ordinance refers to water suitable for drinking.
21.

Mineral Mountain Ranchos was approved as a subdivision in 1983 under the

representation that Petitioner would "furnish" .73 acre feet of culinary water to each lot in the
subdivision. The Uniform Land Sales Practices Act applies to subdivisions unless the subdivider
provides satisfactory assurance of completion of culinary water improvements at the time the lots
are offered or transferred. In this case Petitioner agreed to supply culinary water to the lots in
1983 but had not yet done so in 1996 and, according to the amended covenants, has no intention
of so doing despite the assurances given to the planning commission in 1983 which resulted in
the approval of the subdivision. The Executive Director is of the opinion and finds that Mineral
Mountain Ranchos falls within the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act and is required to either be
registered or be determined by the Division to be exempt from the registration requirements.
22.

The exemption provisions of Uniform Land Sales Practices Act,

UTAH CODE

ANN. §57-1 l-4(3)(a), allows a subdivider to apply to the Division for an exemption before
offering or disposing of property if a culinary water service provided by water system for public
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service is represented as being available at the property. There is nothing whatsoever in the
record to indicate any claim by Petitioner that culinary water offered by a water corporation is
being represented as available to potential lot purchasers at Mineral Mountain Ranchos. The
Executive Director is therefore of the opinion and finds Petitioner is not entitled to exemption
from registration under the applicable provisions of the Act.
23.

Since the subdivision known as Mineral Mountain Ranchos falls within the

Uniform Land Sales Practices Act but is not exempt, Petitioner must therefore register the
subdivision pursuant to UTAH

CODE ANN.

§57-11-5 prior to making an offer or disposition of

any interest in the property comprising the subdivision.
24.

Petitioner alleged at the hearing below an inability at that time to proceed forward

upon Petitioner's claim of having been denied due process under the cease and desist procedures
followed by the Division pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§57-11-13. At the time of the hearing

below, Petitioner was afforded an additional thirty days within which to develop and present his
arguments on this issue to the Administrative Law Judge. Petitioner failed to do so and by such
failure waived his objections did not preserve a right to have the issue considered on appeal.

ORDER
The Executive Director of the Department of Commerce is of the opinion and finds:
1.

The subdivision known as Mineral Mountain Ranchos falls foursquare within the

provisions of UTAH
2.

CODE ANN.

The subdivision known as Mineral Mountain Ranchos is not entitled ... ar,

exemption pursuant to
3.

§57-11-1 etseq.;

UTAH CODE ANN.

§57-1 l-4(3)(a); and

Petitioner is prohibited by the provisions of

UTAH CODE ANN.

§57-11-5 from

offering or disposing of any interest in the subdivision known as Mineral Mountain Ranchos
until such time as registration is granted by the Division or a temporary permit is issued to
Petitioner by the Division.
And the Executive Director so finding, it is, therefore
10

ORDERED that the determination of the Division of Real Estate that the subdivision
known as Mineral Mountain Ranchos must be registered is hereby affirmed and the order
prohibiting Mineral Mountain Ranchos, Market Wise Investors, Inc., Cress Ferriera and June
Ferriera from offering or disposing of any interest in the subdivision known as Mineral Mountain
Ranchos is likewise affirmed in its entirety until such time as the subdivision is properly
registered with the Division or a temporary permit is issued by the Division of Real Estate.
SO ORDERED this the / —

day of December, 1997.

DOUCXAS
BORB Executive Director
JCJLAS C. BORBK
Utah JDepartment of CoWnerce

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the
Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petition for
Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-16, Utah Code
Annotated.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the X v d a y of December, 1997, the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order on Review by certified mail, properly addressed, postage
prepaid, to:
Mineral Mountain Ranchos
Market Wise Investors, Inc.
Cress Ferriera
June Ferriera
615 N. Lower Sacramento Road
Lodi CA 95242
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to:
J. Craig Jackson, Director
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

MICHAEL R. MEDLEY, Department Counsel
Utah Department of Commerce
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